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A FRAMEWORK FOR EVALUATING EQUAL
ACCESS CLAIMS BY STUDENT RELIGIOUS
GROUPS: IS THERE A WINDOW FOR
FREE SPEECH IN THE WALL
SEPARATING CHURCH AND STATE?
Nadine Strossen*
INTRODUCTION
During the 1985-86 Term, the Supreme Court will review
Bender v. Williamsport Area School District.I In this case, the Court will
confront for the first time the controversial "equal access" issue:
When a public high school 2 allows voluntary, student-initiated non-
religious student groups to meet on school premises, should it grant
equal access to voluntary, student-initiated religious student
groups?3 This novel issue encompasses two difficult constitutional
inquiries. Are schools compelled to grant equal access by the free
speech clause, 4 the equal protection clause, 5 or the establishment
* Assistant Professor and Supervising Attorney, Civil Rights Clinic, New York Uni-
versity School of Law. B.A. 1972, Harvard-Radcliffe College; J.D. 1975, Harvard Law
School. The author expresses deep gratitude to Ralph Brown, Samuel Estreicher,
Randy Hertz, William Nelson, and John Sexton for their helpful comments upon this
manuscript. The author also gratefully acknowledges the research assistance of Lois
Bloom, Michael Rogoff, and Scott Whitsett, the administrative assistance of Harvis &
Zeichner and Washington Square Legal Services, Inc., and the secretarial assistance of
Channabel Latham, Cheryl Moczygemba, and Michael Portantiere. This Article is part
of a more extensive work in progress.
1 741 F.2d 538 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. granted, 105 S. Ct. 1167 (1985).
2 The Article's analysis applies to schools containing lower grade levels as well as
high schools. Because lower level schools are less likely to encounter student-initiated
voluntary religious groups, the Article refers throughout to high schools.
3 The equal access controversy focuses exclusively on the free speech rights of
organized student groups, rather than individual students or informal student groups.
Religious expression by individual students or informal student groups raises fewer es-
tablishment clause concerns. Cf. Wallace v. Jaffree, 105 S. Ct. 2479, 2491 (1985) (sug-
gesting there would be no constitutional problem with students' voluntary prayer during
statutorily mandated moment of silence, so long as statutory purpose was not to pro-
mote prayer).
4 This clause provides: "Congress shall make no law. . . abridging the freedom
of speech, or of the press .... " U.S. CoNsT. amend. I. It is binding on the states.
Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925). The free speech clause protects not only the
right of individual students to engage in religious expression, but also their right to
associate for such purposes. NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460-61 (1958).
5 This clause provides: "No state . . . shall . . . deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1. The analy-
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clause?6 Or are they prohibited from granting equal access by the
establishment clause?
As the Third Circuit stated in Bender, this issue implicates "a
constitutional conflict of the highest order."'7 Both the free speech
and anti-establishment concerns, which weigh in favor of opposing
conclusions, are unusually compelling. On the one hand, as a con-
tent-based prior restraint on free speech," the denial of equal access
suffers under a double presumption of unconstitutionality. 9 On the
other hand, the courts have consistently enforced the establishment
sis of content-based restrictions upon free speech or associational rights on public prop-
erty is the same under the equal protection clause as under the free speech clause. See,
e.g., Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 461-63 (1980); Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley,
408 U.S. 92, 98-99 (1972). For the sake of brevity, this Article refers only to the free
speech clause.
6 This clause provides: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment
of religion. .. " U.S. CONST. amend. I. It is binding on the states. Everson v. Board of
Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947).
Although the establishment clause is usually invoked to challenge governmental fa-
voritism toward religion, it also prohibits governmental hostility toward religion. See,
e.g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 104 S. Ct. 1355, 1359 (1984). Most equal access opinions have
not discussed the establishment clause problems resulting from the denial-as opposed
to the grant-of access. However, in Chess v. Widmar, 635 F.2d 1310 (8th Cir. 1980),
afld sub. nom. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981), the Eighth Circuit held that the
establishment clause required a public university to grant equal access to a student reli-
gious group. See id. at 1317-18 (denial of equal access has primary effect of inhibiting
religion, and "hopelessly entangles" university in defining religion, determining
whether proposed event involves religious worship, and monitoring events to ensure no
prohibited activity occurs).
Student religious groups seeking access to school premises have also based their
claims on the free exercise clause, which provides that "Congress shall make no law...
prohibiting the free exercise" of religion, U.S. CONST. amend. I, and is binding on the
states. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940). However, the courts have unani-
mously rejected the asserted free exercise rationale for equal access. See infra notes 52 &
53 and accompanying text.
7 741 F.2d at 557.
8 See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 267 n.5 (1981) (university's refusal to per-
mit student group to meet on campus constitutes prior restraint upon students' expres-
sive rights); Accord Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 184 (1972).
9 With respect to prior restraints on speech, see, e.g., New York Times Co. v.
United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (per curiam): "Any system of prior restraints
comes to this Court bearing a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity."
The government can overcome this heavy presumption only if it can "prove the unpro-
tected character of the particular speech with certainty and show the irreparable nature
of the harm that would occur if a [prior] restraint were not imposed .... .. L. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 731 (1978). The Supreme Court has almost never
found a prior restraintjustified. Id. at 729. With respect to content-based regulations of
speech, see, e.g., Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95-96 (1972):
"[A]bove all else, the First Amendment means that government has no power to restrict
expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content." Courts
will sustain a content-based speech regulation only where the government can prove
that it "is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn to
achieve that end." Widmar, 454 U.S. at 270. This stringent showing can rarely be made.
See, e.g., Carey, 447 U.S. at 465.
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clause most rigorously in the public school setting.' 0
Although the equal access issue has recently spawned much leg-
islation,1 litigation, and public debate, the Supreme Court has not
yet provided any clear guidance for resolving the fundamental con-
stitutional conflicts presented. In Widmar v. Vincent, the Court held
that a public university had to grant equal access to a university stu-
dent religious group, but it expressly distinguished, and reserved
judgment on, the corresponding high school situation. 12
The four circuit courts that have squarely faced the high school
equal access question left unanswered by Widmar have all ruled that
student religious groups should not be permitted to meet on school
premises.' 3 However, these decisions employed divergent analyti-
cal approaches. Two of them effectively espoused per se rules
prohibiting any concerted student religious expression in public
schools. 14 The other two-one of which is the Third Circuit's Bender
ruling-employed ad hoc analyses, expressly recognizing that in
certain circumstances, equal access would be constitutionally man-
dated. 15 Although the Supreme Court's ruling in Bender may fail to
answer all questions raised by equal access controversies, 16 it will
10 See L. TRIBE, supra note 9, at 841 n.9.
[B]ecause of their central and delicate role in American life, public
schools must be insulated from religious ceremony under the aegis of the
establishment clause, even where no coercion can be shown, whereas in
other public forums free exercise values permit some accommodation of
[religion].
Id.
11 For example, the federal Equal Access Act, which became effective in August
1984, guarantees equal access to secondary school students who seek to hold religious
meetings on school premises, under specified circumstances. Pub. L. No. 98-377, 98
Stat. 1302 (1984) (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 4071 (1984)).
12 454 U.S. 263, 274 n.14 (1981).
13 Bell v. Little Axe Indep. School Dist. No. 70, 766 F.2d 1391 (10th Cir. 1985);
Bender, 741 F.2d 538 (3d Cir. 1984); Lubbock Civil Liberties Union v. Lubbock Indep.
School Dist., 669 F.2d 1038 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1155 (1983); Brandon
v. Board of Educ., 635 F.2d 971 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1123 (1981)..
Another recent Court of Appeals decision, Nartowicz v. Clayton County School
Dist., 736 F.2d 646 (11th Cir. 1984), also involved the propriety of a student religious
group's meeting on school premises, but the limited record in that case does not reveal
whether the school had an equal access policy. Id. at 649. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed
the district court order that preliminarily enjoined the school district from permitting a
junior high school student religious group to meet on school premises, after school
hours, under faculty supervision. Given this procedural posture, the Eleventh Circuit's
specific holding was quite narrow: the district court had not abused its discretion in
concluding that the school's practice of permitting these meetings was likely to be
found, after further judicial proceedings, to violate the establishment clause. Id.
14 Lubbock, 669 F.2d 1038; Brandon, 635 F.2d 971.
15 Bell, 766 F.2d 1391; Bender, 741 F.2d 538.
16 For example, the Court's Bender decision will probably leave unanswered many
questions concerning the constitutionality and interpretation of the Equal Access Act, see
supra note 11. The Bender case arose, and the lower court decisions were issued, before
the Act's effective date.
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probably settle the basic issue of whether such controversies should
be resolved according to a per se rule or on a case-by-case basis.
This Article shows that only a non per se approach is faithful to
both sets of constitutional values implicated in any equal access
case: the free speech values prohibiting content-based discrimina-
tion against speech and protecting high school students' expressive
conduct, as well as the anti-establishment values prohibiting the
public schools from sponsoring any religious expression. Parts I
and II sketch the doctrinal background against which the Supreme
Court will evaluate Bender. Part III focuses upon the precise ques-
tions that Bender poses by analyzing the Third Circuit decision. Part
IV discusses the constitutional necessity for case-by-case evaluations
of equal access issues, and Part V proposes a framework for con-
ducting such evaluations. Finally, Part VI evaluates Bender in accord-
ance with the proposed analytical framework.
I
THE Two CONFLICTING LINES OF SUPREME COURT
PRECEDENTS
A. The Court's Treatment of Religious Expression
In Public Schools
The Supreme Court has found an establishment clause viola-
tion in every case in which it has ruled upon state-sanctioned reli-
gious expression on public school premises, even if individual
student participation was at least arguably voluntary. Specifically,
the Court has struck down: a "released time" program whereby-
religious teachers provided religious instruction in public school
classrooms during the school day to students electing to attend;' 7
organized classroom Bible readings or prayer, with teachers leading
or participating;1 8 the prohibition of the teaching of Darwinian
evolution theory; 19 the posting of copies of the Ten Command-
ments on classroom walls;20 and a mandatory "moment of silence"
for purposes of meditation or prayer.21
17 Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948). But see Zorach v.
Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952) (upholding program whereby public school students
whose parents make written requests may leave school during school day and go to
religious centers for religious instruction).
18 School Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Engel v. Vitale,
370 U.S. 421 (1962).
19 Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968). The Court concluded that this prohi-
bition had no secular purpose but reflected the "fundamentalist sectarian conviction"
that "the Book of Genesis must be the exclusive source of doctrine as to the origin of
man." Id. at 107-108.
20 Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980) (per curiam).
21 Wallace v. Jaffree, 105 S. Ct. 2479 (1985).
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In his treatise on American constitutional law, Professor Lau-
rence Tribe articulates the rationale underlying this line of cases:
[Public schools are] the facilities through which basic norms are
transmitted to our young. It is thus unsurprising that no major
religious activity, however "voluntary," has been allowed to take
place in the facilities through which we inculcate values for the
future.22
As Professor Tribe indicates, in all of the Court's decisions concern-
ing public school religious expression, the school was functioning in
an inculcative capacity. The religious expression occurred in the
classroom, during mandatory instructional periods, while the
teacher was at least present and, in most cases, actually participating
in or leading such expression. As the Supreme Court has repeatedly
recognized, however, our nation's public school system aims to
serve a dual role: not only to inculcate the majoritarian views and
values deemed necessary for meaningful citizenship, but also to pro-
vide a "marketplace of ideas," stimulating free individual inquiry. 23
In implementing an equal access policy, a school would be function-
ing in its noninculcative, intellectual marketplace role. Therefore,
the establishment clause concerns that prompted the Court's invali-
dation of public school religious expression when the school was
acting as inculcator would not necessarily justify the invalidation of
such expression when the school is serving as a marketplace of
ideas. 24
The Court's chief concern in these cases is the risk that students
could perceive the school as endorsing or supporting religion.25
The Court has repeatedly expressed a concern that, because of
young people's particular impressionability, they might be more
likely than adults to perceive any religious expression that occurs on
school premises as manifesting the school's approval of religion.26
The Court has also expressed the fear that, as a result of such per-
ceived approval, students adhering to a minority religion or no reli-
gion might feel more alienated, or be more susceptible to
indoctrination, than adults would be.27
22 L. TRIBE, supra note 9, at 825.
23 See, e.g., Board of Educ., Island Trees Union Free School Dist. v. Pico, 457 U.S.
853, 864 (1982) (plurality opinion). See infra text accompanying notes 84-93.
24 See infra note 92 and text accompanying notes 92-93.
25 Cf. L. TRIBE, supra note 9, at 825 n.15.
26 See, e.g., McCollum, 333 U.S. at 227 (Frankfurter, J., concurring):
That a child is offered an alternative may reduce the constraint; it does
not eliminate the operation of influence by the school .... The law of
imitation operates, and non-conformity is not an outstanding characteris-
tic of children.
Id.
27 See, e.g., id.:
1985]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
The Supreme Court's longstanding goal of insulating public
school students from any apparent governmental endorsement of
religion animated its most recent decision involving public school
religious expression, Wallace v. Jaffree.28 Adopting a standard that
Justice O'Connor had formulated during the preceding Term,29 the
six Justices who joined in the Wallace judgment agreed that the key
inquiry in evaluating public school student religious expression is
whether the government either intends to endorse or is perceived as
endorsing religion. The Court struck down the challenged
mandatory moment of silence statute, because it was intended to
convey a message of governmental approval of religion. 30
TheJaffree decision has significant implications for the equal ac-
cess controversy. Several of the opinions expressly recognize that
the establishment clause might permit some mandatory moments of
silence in public schools. 31 But the opinions expressing this view
also state that grade and high school students are more subject to
religious indoctrination and peer pressure than adults.3 2 Conse-
quently, the Justices who joined in these opinions evidently believe
that, notwithstanding grade and high school students' relative im-
pressionability or immaturity, they can nonetheless understand the
[There] is an obvious pressure upon children to attend. . . . The chil-
dren belonging to these non-participating sects will thus have inculcated
in them a feeling of separatism when the school should be the training
ground for habits of community, or they will have religious instruction in
a faith which is not that of their parents.
Id. See also Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 792 (1983) (distinguishing between adults
not susceptible to "religious indoctrination" and children subject to "peer pressure").
28 105 S.Ct. 2479 (1985).
29 From at least 1971 until 1984, the touchstone in establishment clause cases was
the tripartite test first specifically enunciated in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602
(1971). Under Lemon, no government policy or practice can pass muster under the es-
tablishment clause unless: (1) it has a secular purpose; (2) its primary effect neither ad-
vances nor inhibits religion; and (3) it does not foster excessive entanglement between
government and religion. Id. at 612-13. In Lynch v. Donnelly, 104 S. Ct. 1355 (1984),
the Court stated that it would no longer necessarily employ the Lemon test in all estab-
lishment clause cases, id. at 1362, although it did not propose an alternative test and has
subsequently continued to rely on Lemon. See, e.g., Grand Rapids School Dist. v. Ball,
105 S. Ct. 3248 (1985); Aguilar v. Fenton, 105 S. Ct. 3232 (1985); Estate of Thornton v.
Caldor, 105 S. Ct. 2479 (1985); Tony and Susan Alamo Found. v. Secretary of Labor,
105 S. Ct. 1953 (1985). Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion in Lynch formulated a
"refined Lemon test," under which the central issue is whether the challenged govern-
mental action is either intended to convey a message of governmental endorsement (or
disapproval) of religion or is likely to be perceived as conveying such a message. 104 S.
Ct. at 1368 (O'ConnorJ, concurring). The Court has invoked this "refined Lemon test"
in several post-Lynch establishment clause cases. See, e.g., Grand Rapids, 105 S. Ct. at
3226; Wallace v. Jaffree, 105 S. Ct. at 2493.
3o 105 S. Ct. at 2492.
31 Id at 2491 (majority opinion); id. at 2493 n.2 (Powell, J., concurring); id. at 2498-
99 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
52 Id. at 2492, n.51 (majority opinion); id. at 2495 n.9 (Powell, J., concurring); id. at
2503 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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distinction between a school's endorsement of religious expression
and its neutral provision of an opportunity during which students
may choose to engage in such expression. These Justices evidently
regard students as capable of distinguishing between the school's
inculcative and noninculcative functions. Thus, although Jaffree
makes clear that the Supreme Court will continue to examine public
school religious expression with special vigilance, it also indicates
that the Court will not necessarily invalidate all such expression. In
particular,Jaffree indicates that the Court may well uphold concerted
public school religious expression when, as under an equal access
policy, the school neither acts nor is perceived as sponsor or
inculcator.33
B. The Court's Treatment of All Expression in Public Forums
and Public Schools
Although individuals have no general right of access to public
property for purposes of exercising their free speech rights, they do
have such a right of access to particular types of government prop-
erty, which the courts have labelled "public forums."'34 Certain
types of public property are traditionally deemed public forums.
The quintessential examples of these "inherent" public forums are
sidewalks, streets, and parks.35 Additionally, whenever the govern-
ment has actually opened some property for free speech purposes,
that property is regarded as a "designated" public forum. In either
an inherent or a designated public forum, the government cannot
impose any content-based restriction upon speech, unless it can
prove that the restriction is necessary to promote a compelling state
interest.36
One final aspect of public forum law is particularly germane to
33 Insofar as a moment of silence occurs during the regular school day, in a class-
room, with a teacher presiding, it implicates greater establishment concerns than does a
grant of equal access to a student religious group. However, a grant of equal access
implicates greater establishment concerns insofar as students audibly engage in con-
certed religious expression.
34 See, e.g., L. TRIBE, supra note 9, at § 12-2 1; Kalven, The Concept of the Public Forum:
Cox v. Louisiana, 1965 Sup. CT. REV. 1.
35 This notion is eloquently expressed in Justice Roberts's oft-quoted dictum in
Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939).
Wherever the title of streets and parks may rest, they have immemorially
been held in trust for the use of the public and, time out of mind, have
been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between
citizens, and discussing public questions. Such use of the streets and
public places has, from ancient times, been a part of the privileges, immu-
nities, rights, and liberties of citizens.
36 For a recent summary of the principles governing inherent and designated public
forums, see Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, 105 S. Ct. 3439, 3448-51
(1985).
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the equal access issue. Public property may be designated as a "lim-
ited public forum," available only for limited expressive purposes.
For example, the government may designate public property as a
forum for speech by certain categories of speakers. It may then ex-
clude other categories of speakers, but it may not discriminate
among members of the included categories on the basis of con-
tent. 37 Similarly, the government may designate property as a fo-
rum for speech about certain subjects. It may then prohibit speech
about other subjects, but it may not discriminate against speech
about the included subjects because of its content.38 Any distinc-
tions drawn between those speakers or subjects to which a limited
public forum is available, and those to which it is not, must be "nec-
essary to reserve the . . .forum to expressive activity compatible
with the property," and must also be viewpoint neutral.39
The Supreme Court has not yet had occasion expressly to apply
to public school students the free speech principles concerning pub-
lic forums. However, the Court has made clear that students are
generally entitled to the same free speech rights as adults. In its
seminal decision recognizing such rights, Tinker v. Des Moines In-
dependent Community School District, the Court declared, "It can hardly
be argued that ... students ... shed their constitutional rights to
freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate." 40 The
Court repeatedly emphasized that schools could restrict students'
37 See, e.g., Widmar, 454 U.S. 263 (limited public forum for speech by university
students).
38 See, e.g., City of Madison Joint School Dist. No. 8 v. Wisconsin Employment Rela-
tions Comm'n., 429 U.S. 167 (1976) (limited public forum for speech about school
board business).
39 Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, Inc., 105 S. Ct., at 3458.
Even if public property has been opened for some expressive purposes, it will be
deemed a "nonpublic forum" if the government did not intend to create a public or
limited public forum or if "the nature of the property is inconsistent with expressive
activity." Id. at 3450. Access to a "nonpublic forum can be based on subject matter and
speaker identity so long as the distinctions drawn are reasonable in light of the purpose
served by the forum and are viewpoint neutral." Id. at 3451. If a public school student
forum were classified as a nonpublic forum, the exclusion of a student religious group,
because of establishment concerns, would probably satisfy this reasonableness standard.
Whether a particular high school student forum should be classified as a limited public
forum or a nonpublic forum would depend upon how broadly the school defined the
appropriate subject matter. A school could perhaps create a nonpublic forum by selec-
tively granting access to a narrowly defined set of student groups. See Perry Educ. Ass'n
v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45-48 (1983) (public school's selective
grants of access to internal mail system did not give rise to limited public forum). For
example, a school might grant access to curriculum-related student clubs without
thereby incurring the obligation to grant access to noncurriculum-related clubs. The
Equal Access Act provides that a school creates a limited student forum only when it
grants access to a noncurriculum-related student group. 20 U.S.C. § 4071(a)-(b) (1984).
See infra note 128.
40 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969).
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expressive conduct only based upon specific evidence demonstrat-
ing that such conduct would "substantially interfere with the work
of the school or impinge upon the rights of other students. 41
II
CURRENT EQUAL ACCESS CASE LAW
A. Widmar v. Vincent
The only Supreme Court decision expressly addressing the ten-
sion between the anti-establishment and free speech concerns dis-
cussed in the preceding section is Widmar v. Vincent.42 The public
university involved in Widmar made its facilities generally accessible
to voluntary, student-initiated nonreligious student groups. The
Court ruled that the university violated the free speech clause by not
making these facilities equally accessible to a voluntary, student-ini-
tiated religious student group, which sought to engage in prayer
and worship.
The Widmar Court emphasized the numerous and diverse stu-
dent groups meeting on campus43 and held that the university had
designated its campus as a limited public forum for students. This
finding not only led to the Court's conclusion that the free speech
clause barred content-based exclusions of student speakers,44 but it
also led to the Court's conclusion that a grant of equal access would
not violate the establishment clause because no reasonable student
should perceive the university as endorsing the group's religious
message.
The Court in Widmar stressed that "an open forum in a public
university does not confer any imprimatur of State approval on reli-
gious sects or practices" because an equal access policy " 'would no
more commit the University . . . to religious goals' than it is 'now
committed to the goals of the Students for a Democratic Society, the
Young Socialist Alliance,' or any other group eligible to use its facil-
ities." 45 In a footnote immediately following this statement, how-
ever, the Court suggested that the establishment clause analysis
41 Id. at 509 (school violated students' free speech rights by suspending them for
wearing black armbands to protest Vietnam War because no evidence of requisite ad-
verse impact).
42 454 U.S. 263 (1981). While Widmar acknowledged the potential conflict be-
tween free speech clause and establishment clause values, it did not resolve this conflict.
Because the Court concluded that granting access to the student religious group would
not violate the establishment clause, it did not have to "reach the questions that would
arise if state accommodation of. . . free speech rights should, in a particular case, con-
flict with the prohibitions of the Establishment Clause." Id. at 273 n.13.
43 Id. at 265, 274.
44 Id. at 277.
45 Id. at 274 (quoting Chess v. Widmar, 635 F.2d 1310, 1317 (8th Cir. 1980)).
1985]
CORNELL LA W REVIEW
might be different in the context of a public high school student
forum:
University students are, of course, young adults. They are less
impressionable than younger students and should be able to ap-
preciate that the University's policy is one of neutrality toward
religion. 46
In this important footnote, Widmar implicitly rejects any per se rule
granting equal access for concerted religious speech in high school.
However, it certainly does not endorse any converse per se rule be-
cause it does not find that all "younger students" are so "impres-
sionable" that they would be inherently incapable of appreciating a
school's neutral role under an equal access policy. Nor does Widmar
provide any further specific guidance for resolving high school
equal access issues.
Widmar marked a significant development in the legal status of
concerted religious speech in public educational institutions. Sev-
eral previous Supreme Court decisions had treated prayer and other
devotional expression in traditional public forums as protected free
speech.47 However, the Court had not previously analyzed con-
certed religious expression in public educational institutions as free
speech protected under the limited public forum doctrine. Instead,
its prior decisions had treated such expression as a religious exer-
cise, protected by the free exercise clause, and hence presenting po-
tential conflicts between the establishment clause and the free
exercise clause.48 Widmar was therefore novel both in analyzing
concerted student religious expression as protected by the free
speech clause 49 and, correspondingly, in stating that such expres-
sion presented a potential conflict between the establishment clause
and the free speech clause. 50
The Widmar Court's holding turned on its treatment of con-
certed student religious expression as protected under the free
46 Id. at n.14.
47 See, e.g., Heffron v. Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640, 652-53
(1981); Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268 (1951); Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558
(1948).
48 See, e.g., School Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222, 225-26
(1963); Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 211-12 (1948).
49 The novelty of Widmar's analysis is underscored by the fact that only one year
earlier, the Second Circuit had ruled that concerted student prayer is not protected free
speech. Brandon v. Board of Educ., 635 F.2d 971, 980 (1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1123
(1981).
50 This constitutional conflict is clearly novel. Although Professor Tribe's compre-
hensive treatise on American constitutional law devotes several sections to the tension
between the establishment clause and the free exercise clause, it contains no discussion
of the tension between the establishment and the free speech clauses. See L. TRIBE, supra
note 9, at §§ 14-3 to 14-7.
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speech clause,51 rather than simply under the free exercise clause.
Courts have unanimously held that the exclusion of religious ex-
pression from public educational institutions does not violate the
free exercise clause.52 Although the Widmar majority did not reach
the student religious group's free exercise claim, the sole Justice
who did analyze that claim rejected it. 53 Thus, Widmar's analysis of
religious expression in public educational institutions under free
speech clause theories creates, for the first time, a serious possibility
that such expression will be constitutionally protected.
B. Courts of Appeals Decisions
Four courts of appeals have ruled on the merits of equal access
claims. 54 The rationale of two decisions-the Second Circuit's Bran-
51 Justice White criticized the majority's conclusion that the free speech clause pro-
tects prayer and other devotional religious expression as "plainly wrong," 454 U.S. at
284 (White, J., dissenting). In response, the majority noted thatJustice White's position
would require distinguishing "prayer" or "worship" from other types of religious
speech that even Justice White would recognize as protected, for example, descriptions
of religious experiences and religious appeals to nonbelievers. Id. at 269 n.6. The ma-
jority then pointed out three problems with this distinction: it is difficult, if not impossi-
ble, to draw; it would lead to entanglement between government and religion; and the
assertedly unprotected types of religious speech no more threaten establishment clause
values than do the concededly protected types. Id. Some of the problems that would
result from a rule purporting to distinguish prayer and other devotional religious ex-
pression from protected speech are illustrated by Reilly v. Noel, 384 F. Supp. 741 (D.
R.I. 1974). Plaintiffs, a group of welfare recipients and their sympathizers, both clerical
and lay, protested certain government welfare cutbacks on moral grounds. Plaintiffs
determined that services in the state capitol building, consisting of religious songs, re-
sponsive readings from the Bible, and prayer, would effectively convey their opposition.
Without even mentioning either first amendment religion clause, the court held that the
government violated plaintiffs' free speech rights by seeking to stop their services.
Although plaintiffs' speech was quintessentially religious and devotional in form, it was
intended to convey a political message.
52 See, e.g., Bell v. Little Axe Indep. School Dist. No. 70, 766 F.2d 1391, 1400 n.6
(10th Cir. 1985); Lubbock Civil Liberties Union v. Lubbock Indep. School Dist., 669
F.2d 1038, 1048 (5th Cir. 1982); Brandon, 635 F.2d at 976-78; Bender v. Williamsport
Area School Dist., 563 F. Supp. 697, 703 (M.D. Pa. 1983), rev'd, 741 F.2d 538 (3d Cir.
1984), cert. granted, 105 S.Ct. 1167 (1985); Stein v. Oshinsky, 348 F.2d 999 (2d Cir.
1965). For the rationale underlying these rulings, see, e.g., Brandon.
We do not challenge the students' claim that group prayer is essential to
their religious beliefs. ...
... [However,] the school's rule [prohibiting group prayer on school
property] does not place an absolute ban on communal prayer. ...
While school attendance is compelled for several hours per day, five days
per week, the students . . . are free to worship together as they please
before and after the school day and on weekends in a church or any other
suitable place. . . . We do not have before us the case of a Moslem who
must prostrate himself five times daily in the direction of Mecca. . ..
635 F.2d at 977.
53 454 U.S. at 289.
54 See supra note 13. But see Clergy & Laity Concerned v. Chicago Bd. of Educ., 586
F. Supp. 1408 (N.D. Ill. 1984) (where school board granted military recruiter access to
schools, its denial of access to antiwar activists constituted prohibited viewpoint discrim-
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don v. Board Education55 and the Fifth Circuit's Lubbock Civil Liberties
Union v. Lubbock Independent School District 56 -are fully consistent with
a per se rule precluding concerted student religious expression in
public schools. Although neither expressly espoused such an abso-
lute prohibition, both declared that "a high school is not a 'public
forum' where religious views can be freely aired."'57 Thus, both
courts apparently believed that no high school can create a forum
for concerted student religious expression that will not give rise to
perceptions that the school is endorsing religion. These rulings
were largely based upon the courts' unsupported generalizations or
presumptions that high school students are innately immature and
impressionable and hence likely to perceive any religious expression
on school premises as school-endorsed. 58
In contrast with Brandon and Lubbock, the other two equal access
decisions by Courts of Appeals-the Third Circuit's decision in
Bender and the Tenth Circuit's recent decision in Bell v. Little Axe In-
dependent School District No. 70-employed ad hoc analyses, focusing
upon the particular facts presented. Although both decisions held
that the equal access policies under review violated the establish-
ment clause, each explicitly acknowledged that other equal access
policies might pass muster under the establishment clause. 59 In-
deed, in Bell, which involved a school containing grades 1-9, the
Tenth Circuit expressly refused to generalize that even an elemen-
tary school is absolutely incapable of creating an open student fo-
rum sufficient to trigger a right of access for concerted student
religious expression. 60
ination). The court rejected the school board's argument that granting access to one of
the antiwar activists, a clergyman, would violate the establishment clause, in part by rely-
ing upon Widmar and stating: "even if... plaintiffs' messages were religious, a policy
of equal access would not be violative of the establishment clause." Id. at 1412. The
court did not even suggest, much less hold, that Widmar might not be fully applicable to
the high school setting.
55 635 F.2d 971 (2d Cir. 1980).
56 669 F.2d 1038 (5th Cir. 1982).
57 Lubbock, 669 F.2d at 1048; Brandon, 635 F.2d at 980.
58 Lubbock, 669 F.2d at 1046-47; Brandon, 635 F.2d at 978.
59 Bender, 741 F.2d at 561; Bell, 766 F.2d at 1400.
60 766 F.2d at 1401-02. Bell recognized that, because of the particularly important
establishment clause concerns implicated in public elementary schools, stricter religion-
government separation should be required in an elementary school forum than in a uni-
versity or other public forum. Accordingly, rather than prohibiting elementary student
religious groups, the court imposed certain limitations upon them-namely, that they
could not meet during the official school day and that teachers should not be present
during their meetings. Id. at 1406-07. Also in contrast with Brandon and Lubbock, Bell did
not rely upon unsubstantiated generalizations or presumptions about students' relative
immaturity or impressionability, even though it involved younger students. Instead, Bell
relied upon specific, uncontradicted expert testimony concerning the cognitive develop-
ment of students at the various grade levels involved in the case. Id. at 1404 n. 11.
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III.
THE BENDER CASE
Although the Third Circuit in Bender denied the student reli-
gious group's equal access claim, the court stressed that its legal
rulings were dependent on the particular facts before it.61 The high
school had long allowed student groups to meet during a thirty-min-
ute "student activity period," which was regularly scheduled after
the beginning of the school day, two days per week.6 2 Each student
group was required to have a school-approved adult "advisor," who
was usually a faculty member, but could also be another school em-
ployee or a parent. These advisors were required to attend the stu-
dent group meetings. They were also authorized, although not
required, to participate in the meetings.6 3 While all students had to
be on school premises during the activity period, they did not have
to participate in any group meeting. 4
The Bender case arose when a group of students formed an or-
ganization called "Petros," which they described as a "non-denomi-
national prayer fellowship," and sought permission to meet during
the activity period. The students stated that Petros's activities
would include scripture reading, discussion, and prayer.65 The
principal had authority to withhold permission for any meetings that
would not "contribute to the intellectual, physical or social develop-
ment of the students," or were not "legal and constitutionally
proper."66 To the best of the current principal's recollection, no
student club or activity had previously been disapproved. 67 How-
ever, acting on advice of counsel that Petros's meetings would vio-
late the establishment clause, the principal denied permission for
such meetings. 68 The students responded by commencing a lawsuit.
The District Court upheld the students' claim that the school's
refusal to allow Petros to meet on the same terms as other student
groups, solely because of its religious nature, violated their free
speech rights.69 A divided panel of the Third Circuit reversed. In
61 741 F.2d at 560 n.30.
62 Id. at 543; see also 563 F. Supp. at 709.
63 741 F.2d at 544 & n.10.
64 Id. at 543.
65 Id. at 542.
66 Id. at 543-44.
67 Id. at 543. He had served as principal since 1974, and his testimony constituted
the only evidence on this point.
68 Id.
69 563 F. Supp. at 700. However, the district court rejected the students' free exer-
cise claim, explaining that their inability to meet at school during the student activity
period did not "force them to forego their religious belief in group worship." Id. at 703.
The court further noted that, even if the school should have accommodated the stu-
dents' belief in group worship, it had attempted such an accommodation by offering to
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contrast with the Second and Fifth Circuits, the Third Circuit con-
cluded that "nothing precludes the existence of a forum in a high
school setting."' 70 In light of the evidence, the Third Circuit found
that the school district had in fact created a limited public forum for
high school students and that Petros's proposed activities fell within
the parameters of this forum. Therefore, the Third Circuit ruled
that the free speech clause protected the rights of Petros members
to engage in concerted religious speech during the activity period. 7'
The Third Circuit also ruled, however, that allowing Petros to
meet during the student activity period would violate the establish-
ment clause. 72 This ruling rested primarily upon the court's deter-
mination that, because of high school students' relative immaturity,
they would perceive a grant of equal access to Petros as reflecting
the school's approval of religion.73 The Court also relied on the
following additional factors which, in the Court's view, distinguish
colleges from high schools: the more obvious presence that a reli-
gious group would "unavoidably" have within a high school because
of its more structured and controlled environment; compulsory stu-
dent attendance; and, pursuant to state law, the constant supervi-
sion of high school students by adult school authorities. 74 The
Court concluded that all of these factors increase the likelihood that
high school students would perceive a grant of equal access as con-
veying the school's endorsement of religion.
The Third Circuit was thus faced with an unprecedented consti-
tutional dilemma: a denial of equal access to the Petros students
would violate their free speech rights, but a grant of equal access
would violate the establishment clause. 75 The court devised a novel,
open-ended balancing test to resolve this dilemma:
[T]he appropriate analysis requires weighing the competing inter-
ests protected by each constitutional provision, given the specific
facts of the case, in order to determine under what circumstances the
net benefit which accrues to one of these interests outweighs the
net harm done to the other. Recognizing that, under these cir-
let them meet off school grounds during the activity period. Id. These free exercise
rulings were not challenged on appeal. See 741 F.2d at 541 n.l.
70 741 F.2d at 548.
71 Id. at 550.
72 Id. at 555.
73 Id. at 552-55.
74 Id. at 552.
75 Id. at 557. Widmar did not confront this conflict because it held that granting'
equal access would not violate the establishment clause. See supra note 42. Conversely,
Brandon and Lubbock did not face the conflict because they held that there was no free
speech right of access. See supra text accompanying notes 55-58. Thus, the Third Circuit
accurately characterized the question before it as one "of first impression." 741 F.2d at
558.
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cumstances, some constitutional protections must unavoidably be
abridged, we believe that our role is to maximize, as best as possi-
ble, the overall measure of the fundamental rights created by the
Framers, by deciding which course of action will lead to the lesser
deprivation of those rights. 76
Although the Third Circuit observed that the facts of the Bender case
presented a close question under its balancing analysis, it concluded
that establishment clause concerns outweighed free speech
concerns.
7 7
IV. THE CONSTITUTIONAL NECESSITY FOR A NONABSOLUTIST
APPROACH TO EQUAL ACCESS ISSUES
There are three basic alternative approaches for resolving any
high school equal access controversy: an absolute rule granting
equal access to any student religious group; an absolute rule deny-
ing equal access to any student religious group; and an approach
that confers upon schools some discretion to grant or deny equal
access based upon the facts and circumstances involved in any par-
ticular case. Only a case-by-case determination is consistent with
applicable constitutional principles. Not only is there no constitu-
tional justification for either absolutist approach;7 8 more signifi-
76 741 F.2d at 559 (emphasis in original). The balancing analysis that is typical of
constitutional adjudication involves weighing various facts in light of a single legal stan-
dard. See, e.g., Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979) (fourth amendment balanc-
ing test). In contrast, the Third Circuit's approach in Bender requires weighing two
different legal standards, in light of the facts involved, to decide which one to enforce
and which to ignore.
77 741 F.2d at 560. The dissenting opinion contended that the Third Circuit ma-
jority had relied upon unsubstantiated generalizations, rather than specific evidence, in
concluding that equal access would violate the establishment clause. The dissent was
particularly critical of the majority's "forg[ing of a] constitutional principle ... from
vague impressions of the emotional sophistication of high school students." Id. at 563
(Adams, J., dissenting). The dissent contended that the majority's negative presump-
tions about the students' ability to benefit from an open forum were especially unjusti-
fied where before the advent of any student religious group, the school had
independently determined that its students could benefit from such a forum and the
students had, in fact, demonstrated the soundness of this determination by organizing
and maintaining numerous, diverse groups. Id. at 563-65.
78 Either of the two possible per se rules would have the obvious advantage of sim-
plicity. When establishment clause values are at stake, simplicity of application may be
more than just a pragmatic advantage; it is potentially also of constitutional significance.
A governmental act or policy violates the establishment clause if it leads to excessive
entanglement between government and religion. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13. One can
argue that, because an absolute rule would be simpler to administer than an ad hoc
approach, it would entail less religion-state entanglement. However, as equal access
opinions have recognized, some entanglement would be inevitable under either per se
approach. Under a per se prohibition, the school would have to monitor religious ex-
pression to separate permissible expression-for example, a discussion of theology-
from impermissible-for example, a worship service. See supra notes 6 & 51. Some en-
tanglement would also result from a rule granting per se permission because the schools
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cantly, both would entail significant constitutional problems. A rule
granting per se permission to student religious group meetings
would create establishment clause problems, whereas a per se prohi-
bition would be inconsistent with students' free speech rights.
A. Establishment Clause Problems With Per Se Permission
As all the decisions concerning the high school equal access is-
sue have recognized, the establishment clause precludes any per se
rule granting equal access to high school students' concerted reli-
gious speech. 79 This conclusion is consistent with the Supreme
Court cases invalidating public school religious expression, which
recognize the special establishment dangers posed by any expres-
sion that could reasonably be perceived as reflecting the school's
endorsement of religion.80 It is clearly possible that student reli-
gious expression under an equal access policy could reasonably be
perceived as the school's sponsorship of religion. Consequently, no
such expression should be automatically authorized. Only a close
examination of the facts in any particular case can illuminate
whether, as actually implemented, even a facially neutral equal ac-
cess policy has the non-neutral effect of implying a school's support
for religion.8'
would have to supervise student religious group meetings in accordance with applicable
legal obligations. See, e.g., Bender, 741 F.2d at 556-57; Brandon, 635 F.2d at 979. See also
Widmar, 454 U.S. at 272 n. I1 (concluding that more entanglement would result from per
se denial of access than from either per se grant or ad hoc approach). Accord, e.g., Coun-
try Hills Christian Church v. Unified School Dist. No. 512, 560 F. Supp. 1207, 1218 (D.
Kan. 1983) (school board's policy denying use of building during nonschool hours for
religious worship "risks much greater entanglement by attempting to determine what
speech and actions constitute religious worship" than would result from granting equal
access). Even assuming, however, that more entanglement would result from an ad hoc
test than from a per se rule, the entanglement resulting from an ad hoc approach would
clearly not exceed the permissible level. See, e.g., Lemon, 403 U.S. at 615-22. In its most
recent decision concerning this aspect of establishment clause doctrine, the Court stated
that "[t]he critical elements of the entanglement proscribed in Lemon" and other prior
cases are that "the aid is provided in a pervasively sectarian environment" and that "be-
cause assistance is provided in the form of teachers, ongoing inspection is required to
ensure the absence of a religious message." Aguilar v. Felton, 105 S. Ct. 3232, 3238
(1985). Neither element is present in the equal access context. The Widmar Court con-
cluded that the ad hoc resolution of equal access issues in public universities did not
involve excessive entanglement. 454 U.S. at 271-72. This conclusion fully applies to
high schools as well.
79 Bell, 766 F.2d at 1402-07; Bender, 741 F.2d at 550-56; Lubbock, 669 F.2d at 1044-
47; Brandon, 635 F.2d at 978-79. Similarly, in Widmar the Supreme Court emphasized
that its rulings were based upon the particular factual record and should not be read as a
per se authorization of all student religious expression under every university equal ac-
cess policy. 454 U.S. at 273, 276-77.
80 See supra notes 17 to 21 and accompanying text.
81 See, e.g., Jafree, 105 S. Ct. at 2499 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (facially neutral
moment of silence statute could "as actually implemented. . . effectively favor the child
who prays").
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B. Free Speech Clause Problems With Per Se Prohibition
Any content-based speech restriction in a public forum-in-
cluding a limited public forum such as a high school student fo-
rum-must be based upon a compelling justification.8 2 Several
distinctions between colleges and high schools, and between college
students and high school students, give rise to a greater danger that
any concerted religious speech in high schools will be perceived as
conveying the school's endorsement of religion. These differences
warrant a closer scrutiny of student religious speech in high schools
than in colleges. But, as explained in this section, the asserted justi-
fications for denying equal access to student religious expression
may not even afford a rational basis for such a content-based exclu-
sion, let alone the requisite compelling basis. Consequently, they
do not justify a per se prohibition of all such expression. More im-
portantly, a per se prohibition would violate students' free speech
rights.
As the Third Circuit opinion in Bender demonstrates, courts and
commentators have deemed the following alleged distinctions be-
tween colleges and high schools pertinent to the equal access issue:
high schools serve more of an inculcative function; most high school
students are in school because of compulsory education laws; state
laws generally require high schools to exercise some supervision
over students while on school property; and high school students
are generally less mature and more impressionable than college
students.83
The inculcative function of public high schools does not justify
an absolute prohibition of equal access. A public school is intended
to serve not only as the transmitter of majoritarian values, but also
as the facilitator of students' independent thought, inquiry, and dis-
cussion.8 4 Both the Supreme Court and lower courts have expressly
recognized the importance of the public school's second role, as a
"marketplace of ideas."'8 5 Although the noninculcative function
may be more predominant in colleges than in high schools, the
Supreme Court has referred to high schools and colleges inter-
changeably in discussing this essential function of all public educa-
82 See supra text accompanying note 36.
83 See, e.g., Bender, 741 F.2d at 552-53; Lubbock, 669 F.2d at 1046; Brandon, 635 F.2d
at 978-79.
84 See supra text accompanying note 23.
85 See, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503,
512-13 (1969); Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967); Wieman v.
Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 196 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); Shanley v. Northeast
Indep. School Dist., 462 F.2d 960, 968 (5th Cir. 1972); Eisner v. Stamford Bd. of Educ.,
440 F.2d 803, 807 (2d Cir. 1971).
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tional institutions. 8 6 For example, the plurality opinion in Board of
Education, Island Trees Union Free School District v. Pico suggested that
public school students have a constitutional right of access to a di-
versity of ideas in the context of noncurricular activities or forums. 87
Pico thus supports the view that the free speech clause protects stu-
dents' access to diverse ideas in the noncurricular setting of an open
student forum. 88
Even putting aside the Pico plurality view that public school stu-
dents should be granted access to a range of ideas as a matter of
constitutional right, students should be granted such access as a
matter of sound public and educational policy.89 As one court ob-
86 See, e.g., Board of Educ., Island Trees Union Free School Dist. No. 26 v. Pico, 457
U.S. 853, 877 (1982) (plurality opinion); Tinker, 393 U.S. at 512-14 & n.6; Shelton v.
Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487 (1960). See also Cary v. Board of Educ., 427 F. Supp. 945, 952
(D. Colo. 1977), aff'd, 598 F.2d 535 (1979) (while some Supreme Court statements con-
cerning importance of opportunity for independent inquiry in academic setting were
made in higher education context, "that does not destroy their importance in providing
a philosophical guidance" in secondary education context).
87 457 U.S. at 866-68, 871 (plurality opinion). Pico specifically held that public
school officials could not remove books from the school library if the decisive factor
motivating the removal was an intent to deny students access to ideas with which the
officials disagreed. Id. at 871. The Supreme Court remanded the case to the district
court for a determination of whether this standard was violated by the school board's
removal of certain books that it characterized as "anti-American, anti-Christian, anti-
Semitic, and just plain filthy." Id. at 857. Because school officials cannot deny students
access to "anti-Christian" ideas in a noncurricular school setting, they might be equally
precluded from denying students access to Christian ideas in such a setting. If a school
permitted the meetings of an antireligious student group, then the school's denial of
equal access to a student religious group could be considered unconstitutional view-
point discrimination. See supra note 39. See also Widmar, 454 U.S. at 281 (Stevens, J.,
concurring) ("If school facilities may be used to discuss anticlerical doctrine. . . compa-
rable use by a group desiring to express a belief in God must also be permitted.") A
school's denial of access to a religious group while granting access to an anti-religious
group could also create establishment clause problems, as manifesting the school's hos-
tility toward religion. See supra note 6.
88 Petitioners might well defend their claim of absolute discretion in matters
of curriculum by reliance upon their duty to inculcate community values.
But we think that petitioners' reliance upon that duty is misplaced where,
as here, they attempt to extend their claim of absolute discretion beyond
the compulsory environment of the classroom, into the school library and
the regime of voluntary inquiry that there holds sway.
457 U.S. at 869 (emphasis in original). See also Fraser v. Bethel School Dist. No. 403,
755 F.2d 1356, 1364-65 (9th Cir. 1985); Nicholson v. Board of Educ., 682 F.2d 858, 863
(9th Cir. 1982); Seyfried v. Walton, 668 F.2d 214, 216 (3d Cir. 1981); Gambino v.
Fairfax County School Bd., 429 F. Supp. 731, 736 (E.D. Va. 1977), aff'd, 564 F.2d 157
(4th Cir. 1977) (per curiam).
89 See, e.g., Pico, 457 U.S. at 868 (plurality opinion) ("[Aiccess to ideas. . . prepares
students for active and effective participation in the pluralistic, often contentious society
in which they will soon be adult members."); Fraser v. Bethel School Dist. No. 403, 755
F.2d 1356, 1365 (9th Cir. 1985) (by creating open student forum, high school gave stu-
dents "opportunity to gain practical experience in the democratic process"). See generally
van Geel, The Search for Constitutional Limits on Governmental Authority to Incukate Youth, 62
Tax. L. REV. 197, 203, 297 (1983) (argues that courts have inadequately protected stu-
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served, "even those who go on to higher education will have ac-
quired most of their working and thinking habits in grade and high
school," and they need an early opportunity to "operate in an at-
mosphere of open inquiry. . . ,,90 Moreover, denying high school
students an opportunity to develop habits of free inquiry would
be both inequitable and unwise because many do not go on to
college.91
Surely if a school was, or was perceived to be, serving as incul-
cator with respect to any student religious speech, it would trans-
gress the establishment clause. However, a school's designation of
an open student forum under an equal access policy epitomizes its
noninculcative role. Reasonable students should appreciate that
when a school functions as a marketplace of ideas, it generally does
not endorse any ideas that students might exchange in such market-
place.9 2 Any risk that students would misperceive the school's neu-
tral, noninculcative, nonsponsoring role under an equal access
policy should be countered through such measures as disclaimers.
The wholesale exclusion of student religious speech is not necessary
to avert this risk.93
Nor can a per se prohibition of equal access be justified on the
basis of compulsory education and school supervision requirements.
Even assuming that the majority of high school students actually at-
tend school because of legal compulsion, 94 and even assuming that
dents' interests in freedom of belief and assigned too much weight to government's
claimed interest in inculcation, and cites empirical social science evidence assertedly
showing that government has no compelling interest in value inculcation because it does
not serve governmental goals of establishing stable democracy, reducing politically in-
spired violence, producing loyal citizenry, or preparing students for citizenship).
90 Albaum v. Carey, 283 F. Supp. 3, 10-11 (E.D.N.Y. 1968). Accord, e.g., Shanley, 462
F.2d at 972, 977-78 (5th Cir. 1972);James v. Board of Educ., 461 F.2d 566 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 1042 (1972); Cary, 427 F. Supp. at 952-53.
91 See, e.g., Cary, 427 F. Supp. at 953:
To restrict the opportunity for involvement in an open forum for the free
exchange of ideas to higher education would not only foster an unaccept-
able elitism, it would also fail to complete the development of those not
going on to college, contrary to our constitutional commitment to equal
opportunity. Effective citizenship in a participatory democracy must not
be dependent upon advancement toward college degrees. Consequently,
it would be inappropriate to conclude that academic freedom is required
only in the colleges and universities.
Id.
92 Id. (in assessing academic freedom issue, court should consider whether it arises
in context where school acts in inculcative role or in context where student is part of
"open, participatory community").
93 See infra text accompanying note 140.
94 In most states, school attendance ceases to be compulsory once a student has
attained the age of 16, which generally occurs in grade 10 or 11. Therefore, in a high
school with grade levels 9-12 or 10-12, many, if not most, students are no longer subject
to compulsory education requirements. See M. GUGGENHEIM & A. SUSSMAN, THE RIGHTS
OF YOUNG PEOPLE 306 (1985). Moreover, even students below the cut-off age level for
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all schools have some legal responsibility for students whenever
they are on school premises, 95 it still does not follow that students
would regard their schools as endorsing the religious content of any
concerted religious speech that occurs on school premises. The risk
that compulsory attendance and supervision requirements might
lead reasonable students to infer school support for religion
could-and should-be readily countered through reasonable pre-
cautionary measures. 96 Total exclusion of student religious speech
is not necessary for this purpose.
The distinguishing feature between high school and college
students that is most stressed by equal access decisions is high
school students' relative immaturity and impressionability. 97 But
this alleged difference would warrant a blanket prohibition upon
high school equal access only if high school students were inher-
ently too immature and impressionable to be able to differentiate
between a school's neutral provision of an open forum and its parti-
san endorsement of religious expression within that forum.
Although Brandon and Lubbock both asserted such a conclusion,
neither cited any supporting evidence. Such an unsubstantiated
conclusion cannot be justified as a proper exercise of judicial no-
tice. 98 Indeed, some adolescent psychology experts believe that
many high school students are better able to distinguish tolerance
from approval, and less susceptible to indoctrination, than many
college students.99 Moreover, even assuming arguendo that high
school students are inherently immature and impressionable, it still
compulsory attendance probably attend school for reasons other than their legal obliga-
tion to do so. Cf. Note, Students' Constitutional Rights on Public Campuses, 58 VA. L. REV.
552, 554 (1972) (even university education has come to be widely viewed as practical
necessity).
95 See infra notes 137-38.
96 For specific recommendations of such measures, see infra text accompanying
notes 136-39.
97 See supra text accompanying notes 58 & 73.
98 FED. R. EvID. 201(b) authorizes a court to take judicial notice of a "fact ... not
subject to reasonable dispute." High school students' alleged inability to appreciate a
school's neutral role under an equal access policy would not meet this standard. Indeed,
some courts have taken judicial notice of contrary "facts." See, e.g., Fraser, 755 F.2d
1363 ("high school students are beyond the point of being sheltered from the potpourri
of sights and sounds we encounter at every turn in our daily lives"); Seyfried, 668 F.2d
214, 219-20 (RosennJ., concurring) (students attain progressively higher levels of intel-
lectual and emotional development in later secondary school grades); Russo v. Central
School Dist. No. 1, 469 F.2d 623, 633 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 932 (1973)
(tenth graders "are approaching an age when they form their own judgments"); Wilson
v. Chancellor, 418 F. Supp. 1358, 1368 (D. Or. 1976) ("[T]oday's high school students
are surprisingly sophisticated, intelligent, and discerning. They are far from easy prey
for even the most forcefully expressed, cogent, and persuasive words."); Albaum, 283 F.
Supp. at 10 (E.D.N.Y. 1968) ("much of what was formerly taught in many colleges ... is
now covered in the upper grades of good high schools").
99 See Note, The Constitutional Dimensions of Student-Initiated Religious Activity in Public
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would not follow that no student religious group should be permit-
ted to meet under an equal access policy. The risk that students
could mistake the school's neutral role for sponsorship could be
checked through such measures as disclaimers. 10 0
High Schools, 92 YALE L. J. 499, 507-509 (1983). Based upon research in adolescent
psychology, this Note argues:
[H]igh school may in fact be a time when the distinction between toler-
ance based on mutual respect and explicit approval of student expression
is particularly clear - even more clear, perhaps, than in later stages of
life. Thus, not only is the high school student able to make such a distinc-
tion, he is also likely to do so.
Id. at 509. Experts in adolescent psychology, have also opined that college students, at
least in the early years of college, are in a "late adolescent" stage when they are very
impressionable and hence vulnerable to indirect coercion concerning religious beliefs.
See, e.g., White, Problems and Characteristics of College Students, 57 ADOLESCENCE 23, 28
(1980). This analysis is supported by evidence that the typical convert to a nontradi-
tional religion, or "cult," is in the age range of 18-25 and is a college student. C.
STONER &J. PARKE, ALL GOD'S CHILDREN 68, 76 (1977); Schwarz & Kenslow, Religious
Cults, the Individual and the Family, LJ. OF MARITAL AND FAM. THERAPY, at 15, 16.
100 See infra note 140. Ironically, the assertion that high school students are inher-
ently incapable of understanding the school's neutral role in a student forum is logically
inconsistent with the conclusion that equal access must be denied to avoid an establish-
ment clause violation. If students are inherently bound to perceive a school's equal
treatment of student religious groups as conveying its approval of religion, then they
would be equally bound to perceive the school's unequal treatment of student religious
groups as conveying its disapproval of religion. The establishment clause is violated
fully as much by a governmental act or policy that appears to disapprove religion as it is
by one that appears to approve religion. See supra note 6. Therefore, even assuming
arguendo that students are inherently immature and impressionable, it would follow
that the denial of equal access would simply substitute one type of establishment clause
violation for another. Judicial opinions have made this point. See, e.g., Bender, 741 F.2d
at 565 (Adams, J., dissenting); Lubbock, 680 F.2d at 426 (Reavley, J., dissenting from
denial of petition for rehearing en banc). This point should not be confused with the
argument made by proponents of state-mandated, teacher-led prayer in public school
classrooms when they contend that the Court's invalidation of such activities manifests
hostility toward religion. See, e.g., Engel, 370 U.S. at 433-34. As the Court has repeat-
edly noted, students should be able to understand that certain constitutional guarantees
prohibit the government from sponsoring any religious activity in the public school
classroom during the school day. Therefore, reasonable students should not view the
absence of such school-sponsored classroom activities as reflecting governmental hostil-
ity toward religion. It does not follow, however, that students should understand that
constitutional guarantees prohibit them from voluntarily meeting with other students
outside the classroom, outside regular school hours, to engage in religious expression,
particularly when other students are permitted to meet at such times and places to en-
gage in nonreligious expression. A reasonable student might well regard such a distinc-
tion as manifesting governmental hostility toward religion. In any event, if students can
in fact understand that the exclusion of voluntary, student-initiated religious groups
from a student forum does not manifest the school's hostility toward religion, then they
can also understand that the inclusion of religious groups does not manifest the school's
endorsement of religion. A school official or court could potentially determine that a
particular case did in fact present a dilemma between these two basic types of potential
establishment clause violations. However, this Article contends that both potential vio-
lations could still be avoided by invoking alternative measures less drastic than either an
outright grant of access on the same terms applicable to all other student groups or an
outright denial of access. See infra text accompanying notes 130 and 149-52.
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Certain age-based distinctions in legal rights are of course per-
missible.10' But the Supreme Court has closely scrutinized age-
based restrictions on fundamental rights. 0 2 In Tinker and its prog-
eny, the Supreme Court and lower federal courts have been particu-
larly protective of high school students' free speech rights.
Professor Tribe's constitutional law treatise suggests a general stan-
dard for determining when individuals may be deprived of rights on
the basis of their youth. This standard, as well as the Tinker stan-
dard, militates against the per se prohibition of high school stu-
dents' concerted religious speech:
Whenever ... government must provide a convincing justification
for depriving a person of certain kinds of liberty .... highly gener-
alized appeals to the characteristics of "the young" will not do.
Insofar as the deprivation is to be justified by reference to imma-
turity and its supposed consequences, nothing less than demon-
strable incapacity to make acceptable use of the opportunity...
should suffice. 10 3
Free speech rights are clearly among those liberties which gov-
ernment cannot deny an individual in the absence of a "convincing
justification.'' 10 4 Therefore, pursuant to Professor Tribe's sug-
gested approach, the government should not be empowered to de-
prive students of free speech rights merely by asserting
unsubstantiated generalizations about their alleged immaturity and
its supposed consequences-namely, preventing them from under-
standing the school's neutral role in an open student forum. In-
stead, any such deprivation could be justified only by specific
evidence actually demonstrating students' incapacity to make ac-
ceptable use of their free speech rights in an open forum-i.e., spe-
cific evidence actually demonstrating that students would perceive
the school to be endorsing religion.
In cases concerning the free speech rights of high school stu-
dents on nonreligious subjects, the courts have consistently fol-
lowed the approach outlined in both the Tinker decision and the
Tribe treatise. These cases have consistently rejected the presump-
101 See generally L. TRIBE, supra note 9, at § 16-29; Emerson, Toward a General Theory of
the First Amendment, 72 YALE L. J. 877, 938-39 (1963).
102 See, e.g., Pico, 457 U.S. 853; Tinker, 393 U.S. 503. Because youth has not been
deemed a "suspect classification," youth-based classifications are not subject to "strict
scrutiny" under the equal protection clause. Professor Tribe argues that youth should
be a "semi-suspect" classification, in that there must ordinarily be an opportunity for a
young person to rebut any assumed youth-based incapacity. See Tribe, Childhood, Suspect
Classifications, and Conclusive Presumptions: Three Linked Riddles, 39 LAw & CoNTEMP. PROBS.
8 (1975).
103 L. TRIBE, supra note 9, at 1079.
104 See generally id. at § 12-1; T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION
(1970).
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tion that high school students are inherently too immature to be
entitled to the full panoply of free speech rights. 105 Following
Tinker, the lower courts have prohibited school authorities from lim-
iting students' exposure to various ideas or opinions that such au-
thorities do not support.' 06  Moreover, the lower courts have
imposed such prohibitions even when the school authorities have a
legitimate interest in avoiding the impression that they endorse the
ideas or opinions at issue.10 7 In contrast to the operative presump-
tions in Brandon and Lubbock, these cases presume that high school
students are capable of distinguishing a school's neutral provision of
access to a spectrum of ideas and opinions from its partisan en-
dorsement of any particular idea or opinion. 08
In cases concerning nonreligious speech, the students' free
speech rights are not generally counterbalanced by the school's con-
stitutional duty to avoid actually or apparently endorsing the sub-
stance of the students' speech.109 It would be appropriate to ascribe
less weight to the school's nonconstitutionally-based interests in
105 See, e.g., Fraser, 755 F.2d 1356; Russo, 469 F.2d 623; Garvin v. Rosenau, 455 F.2d
233 (6th Cir. 1972); Riseman v. School Comm., 439 F.2d 148 (1st Cir. 1971); Scoville v.
Board of Educ., 425 F.2d 10 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 826 (1970); Stanton v.
Brunswick School Dist., 577 F. Supp 1560 (D. Me. 1984); Fricke v. Lynch, 491 F. Supp.
381 (D. R.I. 1980); Wilson v. Chancellor, 418 F. Supp. 1358 (D. Or. 1976); Dixon v.
Beresh, 361 F. Supp. 253 (E.D. Mich. 1973).
1O6. See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 511 (students "may not be confined to the expression of
those sentiments that are officially approved.") Accord, e.g., Shanley, 462 F.2d at 970-72;
Gambino, 429 F. Supp. at 736-37; Bayer v. Kinzler, 383 F. Supp. 1164, 1165-66 (E.D.N.Y.
1974), aftd, 515 F.2d 504 (2d Cir. 1975).
107 See, e.g., Seyfried, 668 F.2d at 216.
108 See, e.g., James v. Board of Educ., 461 F.2d 566, 574 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 1042 (1972).
109 It could be argued that a school has a constitutional duty to avoid the apparent
endorsement of students' nonreligious ideas because such apparent endorsement would
deter other students from expressing disagreement with those ideas, thus infringing
their free speech rights. School officials may have a constitutional right to avoid the
reasonable inference that they endorse ideas with which they do not actually agree. See
Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977) (striking down New Hampshire's requirement
that state motto, "Live Free or Die," be displayed on car license plates, as violating first
amendment right to "refrain from speaking"). However, courts have held that when
there is a constitutional obligation to facilitate the expression of ideas, regardless of
their content, as in a public forum, then no imputation of endorsement could arise that
would be deemed sufficiently reasonable to violate this right. See, e.g., Pruneyard Shop-
ping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980); Gay Student Servs. v. Texas A&M Univ., 737
F.2d 1317, 1330 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1860 (1985). Accordingly, if a
school has created an open student forum, a school official's free speech right to refrain
from apparent endorsement of certain ideas would not justify exclusion of student
groups. However, the standard for determining whether there is a sufficiently reason-
able inference of endorsement to implicate the right to refrain from speaking may differ
from the standard for determining whether there is a sufficiently reasonable inference of
endorsement to implicate establishment clause concerns. Cf. Norwood v. Harrison, 413
U.S. 455, 469-70 (1973) (establishment clause violated by lower level of state support
than that required to violate equal protection clause).
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avoiding perceived endorsement of nonreligious speech than to the
school's constitutional obligation to avoid perceived endorsement
of religious speech. For this reason, it would be appropriate to im-
pose limitations upon students' religious speech based on less evi-
dence of perceived school endorsement than would be required to
impose limitations upon students' nonreligious speech. 11° To go
further, however, by allowing high schools to exclude student reli-
gious speech based upon naked generalizations, would contravene
general principles concerning students' and young people's
rights. 11
V
PROPOSED ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
The preceding Part of this Article suggests two basic considera-
tions that must be taken into account in resolving any equal access
issue consistently with both free speech and anti-establishment con-
cerns. First, a public high school can, in theory, create a neutral
student forum in which content-based restrictions on speech would
be strictly limited. Second, there is a risk that any concerted reli-
gious speech in a high school, even where the school has created a
neutral student forum, could cause a reasonable student perception
that the school sponsors religion. 1 2
110 The proposed analytical framework for evaluating equal access issues accounts
for this distinction by requiring student religious groups to make a greater showing, as a
prerequisite for being granted equal access, than nonreligious groups would be required
to make under traditional public forum principles. See infra text accompanying notes
129-40.
111 See, e.g., Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509. Such a sweeping general prohibition would be
tantamount to a legislative finding that all high school students lack the intellectual and
emotional maturity necessary for participation in the marketplace of ideas. In addition
to depriving high school students of their fundamental free speech rights in the equal
access context, this finding could jeopardize students' free speech and other fundamen-
tal rights in other contexts. If a court finds that all high school students are inherently
too immature to understand the neutrality of the public forum and equal access con-
cepts, could it not also find such students too immature to be exposed to speech about
politics, sex, or other controversial subjects? See, e.g., Trachtman v. Anker, 563 F.2d
512, 518-20 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 925 (1978) (high school students too
immature to be exposed to anonymous, voluntary, student-designed questionnaire
about their sexual experience and attitudes). And could it not further find that, because
of their immaturity, the female students should not make their own decisions, in consul-
tation with their doctors, about whether to have an abortion? That the Supreme Court
has expressly prohibited states from presuming all minor females to be too immature to
make such decisions underscores the flaws in the presumptive approach to the equal
access issue. See, e.g., City of Akron v. Akron Center For Reproductive Health, 462 U.S.
416, 439-40 (1983); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 647-48 (1979); Planned Parenthood
of Cent. Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1975).
112 Both of these generalizations apply to colleges and universities as well as high
schools. Therefore, the basic elements of the suggested analytical framework for evalu-
ating particular equal access claims could be applied in the college and university con-
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It follows from these basic considerations that concerted stu-
dent religious speech should be allowed on high school premises if
and only if two general criteria are met: the school must have cre-
ated a neutral, open student forum; and reasonable students must
not infer that the school endorses religion.' 13 The proposed analyt-
ical framework for determining whether these two general prerequi-
sites have been met in any particular case charts a middle course
between the two inconsistent evidentiary approaches underlying the
two pertinent lines of Supreme Court precedents. The proposed
framework neither elevates one set of constitutional values over the
other nor leaves schools and courts with unconstrained discretion
for resolving conflicts between those values.
A. Inconsistent Evidentiary Approaches Underlying Two Lines
of Supreme Court Precedents
Once a prima facie showing has been made that the govern-
ment has restricted a free speech right, the burden of proof shifts to
the government (or other proponent of the restriction) to demon-
strate that it is justified.1 14 The specific justification that must be
shown depends upon the nature of the restriction. In the case of a
content-based restriction of speech in a public forum, the requisite
showing would be the very difficult one that the restriction was nec-
essary to promote a compelling state interest and that less drastic
alternative measures would not serve that purpose.'" 5 One type of
alternative measure that courts have considered is a content-neutral
text as well. In Widmar, the Supreme Court indicated that equal access cases in the
higher education setting should be decided on the basis of their particular facts and
suggested some pertinent inquiries. However, the Court did not elaborate a generally
applicable analytical approach. See supra text accompanying notes 42-47.
113 The school should make efforts to ensure that every student understands the
neutrality of its open student forum, see infra note 140 and accompanying text. However,
student religious groups should not be restricted or excluded merely because some stu-
dents unreasonably misperceive equal access as reflecting school endorsement of reli-
gion. See Citizens Concerned For Separation of Church and State v. City & County of
Denver, 526 F. Supp. 1310, 1315 (D. Colo. 1981) (court sustains nativity scene display
on public property despite evidence that "most sensitive or fastidious citizens" perceive
display as conveying governmental endorsement of religion). Cf. Roth v. United States,
354 U.S. 476, 489 (1957) (test that "judg[es] obscenity by the effect of isolated passages
upon the most susceptible persons. . . must be rejected as unconstitutionally restrictive
of the freedoms of speech and press").
114 See, e.g., Clark v. Community for Creative Nonviolence, 104 S. Ct. 3065, 3069 n.5
(1984). Appellate courts have reversed decisions upholding speech regulations specifi-
cally because the lower courts did not impose upon the government the burden of prov-
ing such regulations to be justified. See, e.g., Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 184-85
(1972); Ysleta Fed'n of Teachers v. Ysleta Indep. School Dist., 720 F.2d. 1429, 1435 (5th
Cir. 1983); U.S. S.W. Africa/Namibia Trade & Cultural Council v. United States, 708
F.2d 760, 771 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Wright v. Chief of Transit Police, 558 F.2d 67, 68 n.1, 70
(2d Cir. 1977).
115 See, e.g., Widmar, 454 U.S. at 270; Wright, 558 F.2d at 68 n.1, 70.
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regulation upon the time, place and manner of speech. 116
Cases arising under the free speech clause have also repeatedly
held that any restriction upon free speech must be justified by spe-
cific evidence.1 17 For example, directly addressing the public school
context, the Supreme Court declared in Tinker that "undifferenti-
ated fear or apprehension" of disturbance is not enough to over-
come students' freedom of expression. Instead, the Court
demanded specific "evidence that the school authorities had reason
to anticipate" that the students' expressive conduct would cause ad-
verse consequences. 1 8
Under the foregoing evidentiary principles, the denial of equal
access to student religious groups in an open student forum could
not be justified by a general apprehension of establishment clause
problems. Instead, as courts have held in the context of other pub-
lic forums, the apprehension of an establishment clause violation
would not justify excluding religious groups unless such apprehen-
sion was based upon specific evidence. Accordingly, courts have re-
jected generalized arguments that members of the viewing public
would perceive religious expression on public property as manifest-
ing governmental endorsement of religion. Even when there is evi-
dence that some members of the viewing public will perceive such
endorsement-including instances when the viewing public includes
children-the courts have been reluctant to find that these percep-
tions are sufficiently reasonable or widespread to justify special re-
116 See, e.g., U.S. S. W. Africa/Namibia Trade & Cultural Council, 708 F.2d at 771. These
general standards have been applied in the specific setting of the public schools. See,
e.g., Garmin, 455 F.2d at 240 (where high school principal refused to recognize student
antiwar group, alleging school policy against recognizing "partisan" groups, school had
burden of establishing compelling reason for this classification); Russo, 469 F.2d at 632-
33 (school board regulations governing expressive conduct lacked requisite "precision
and less restrictive effect"); Riseman, 439 F.2d at 150 (school should devise rules gov-
erning time, place, and manner of student literature distribution as less drastic alterna-
tive to prohibition of such distribution); Butts v. Dallas Indep. School Dist., 436 F.2d
728, 732 (5th Cir. 1971) (school officials should not prohibit student expressive conduct
"unless ... the circumstances allow them no practical alternative" to avert anticipated
adverse consequences); Fricke, 491 F. Supp. at 386 (recommends specific less restrictive
alternatives that school should invoke, rather than prohibiting student's expressive con-
duct); Cintron v. State Bd. of Educ., 384 F. Supp. 674, 679 (D. P.R. 1974) (school regu-
lations that prohibited circulation of "material ... aimed at promoting movements of a
political-partisan or religious-sectarian character ... on school premises" held uncon-
stitutional as prior restraint on expression, especially where government "has made no
attempt to find a 'less drastic means' to accomplish its permissible purposes"); Dixon,
361 F. Supp. at 254 (school's asserted reason for denying recognition to certain student
groups "is entirely speculative and hence must be discounted").
117 See, e.g., U.S. S. W. Africa/Namibia Trade & Cultural Council, 708 F.2d at 771, 774.
118 393 U.S. at 508, 509. Following Tinker, the lower courts have rigorously en-
forced this requirement. See, e.g., Quarterman v. Byrd, 453 F.2d 54, 59 (4th Cir. 1974);
Eisner v. Stamford Bd. of Educ., 440 F.2d 803, 810 (2d Cir. 1971); Butts, 436 F.2d at
731-32; Scoville, 425 F.2d at 13-14.
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strictions on religious speech." 9 Moreover, in the context of
nonschool public forums, courts have consistently suggested that
the government could eliminate any danger of perceived endorse-
ment through the use of disclaimers. Disclaimers constitute a less
drastic alternative to the total exclusion of religious speech.' 20
The stringent standards for determining whether there is an es-
tablishment clause violation sufficient to limit free speech in public
forums differ significantly from the standards for determining
whether there is any establishment clause violation in a public
school. The Supreme Court's decisions concerning public school
religious expression have not required specific evidence that the
feared violations would result from the challenged expressions. In-
stead, the Court has made assumptions about the inherent likeli-
hood of establishment clause violations arising from certain
characteristics of public schools and their students. 121 Moreover,
the Court has not discussed less drastic alternatives to the complete
prohibition of such expression. Rather than requiring that the pro-
hibition be necessary to avert an actual establishment clause viola-
tion, the Court has expressly approved measures that are sufficiently
broad to counter even potential violations. 12 2
Under the free speech clause precedents, a presumptive right of
119 See, e.g., McCreary v. Stone, 739 F.2d 716, 727 (2d Cir. 1984), aft'd mem. by an
equally divided Court sub nom. Board of Trustees v. McCreary, 105 S. Ct. 1859 (1985) (per
curiam) (rejected contention that children who see nativity scene in public park might
not understand government's neutrality toward religion, because there was little direct
testimony, and no other evidence, to support this conclusion); Jaffe v. Alexis, 659 F.2d
1018 (9th Cir. 1981) (enjoined state agency from prohibiting speech by religious groups
on its property, because of lack of specific evidence substantiating agency's asserted es-
tablishment clause justification); Country Hills Christian Church, 560 F. Supp. at 1216,
1219 (dismissed as "speculative" school district psychologist's opinion that elementary
students would perceive school as endorsing church that used school building for Sun-
day morning worship services, because psychologist did not cite empirical evidence or
studies to support opinion); Citizens Concerned for Separation of Church and State v.
City & County of Denver, 526 F. Supp. 1310, 1312-15 (D. Colo. 1981) (upholding nativ-
ity scene on public property despite evidence that some community members, including
Jewish children, perceived it as conveying governmental approval of Christianity).
120 See infra note 140.
121 See cases cited supra notes 17-21.
122 The Supreme Court's two recent "parochiaid" decisions illustrate the Court's
relatively lenient evidentiary standards governing the finding of an establishment clause
violation in cases "involving the sensitive relationship between government and religion
in the education of our children." Grand Rapids School Dist. v. Ball-, 105 S. Ct. 3216,
3222 (1985); see also Aguilar v. Felton, 105 S. Ct. 3232 (1985). The Court invalidated
certain governmental assistance programs, under which public school employees taught
secular subjects in parochial schools, because of its general apprehension that these
teachers "may well subtly (or overtly) conform their instruction to the environment in
which they teach," causing a prohibited "indoctrinating effect." Grand Rapids, 105 S. Ct.
at 3225. This potential establishment clause violation persuaded the Court to strike
down the programs, even though they had existed for almost twenty years, and even
though there was no evidence of even one incident of the feared indoctrination through-
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access for student religious speech would arise upon the showing of
a student forum that is open as a matter of policy to a sufficiently
broad range of subjects. Following such a showing, the equal access
opponent would bear the heavy-if not impossible-burden of dem-
onstrating that equal access would violate the establishment clause
and that no less drastic alternative than denial of access could avert
the violation. In contrast, under the establishment clause prece-
dents, the equal access proponent would bear the heavy-if not im-
possible-burden of disproving the presumptive establishment
clause dangers deemed inherent in any public school religious
expression.
Under the proposed analytical framework, as distinguished
from both the free speech and establishment clause precedents,
there would be no conclusive presumptions weighing either for or
against equal access. Instead, the school authorities' exercise of dis-
cretion in each case would be evaluated in light of specific standards
designed to ensure the openness of the forum and to minimize the
dangers of actual or apparent school sponsorship of religion. A
school would not be permitted to grant equal access to a student
religious group unless it complied with these standards. If it com-
plied with these standards, a presumption would arise that the grant
of equal access was proper. This presumption would, however, be
subject to rebuttal based upon specific evidence that the students
would perceive the equal access grant as the school's sponsorship of
religion.
B. Showing Required To Establish Equal Access Right
1. Neutral Open Student Forum
Because a public school is not an inherent public forum, a stu-
dent religious group would have no right of access to school prop-
erty unless it could demonstrate that the school had created a
limited public forum for student speech. 123 To demonstrate the
existence of such a forum, the equal access proponent would have to
make two essential showings: that the forum was not created to pro-
mote religion, and that any subject matter limitation upon the forum
is sufficiently broad to include, but not to single out, religion.
The first required showing-that the forum was not created to
promote religion-mirrors the fundamental tenet that, to survive
scrutiny under the establishment clause, a government policy must
have a secular purpose. 124 In evaluating the purpose underlying
out this period. Id. The Court dismissed this lack of evidence, which it expressly ac-
knowledged as "of little significance." Id.
123 See, e.g., Widmar, 454 U.S. at 273; supra text accompanying notes 34-39.
124 See supra note 29. See alsoJafree, 105 S. Ct. 2479 (struck down Alabama's statute
[Vol. 71:143
EQUAL ACCESS
any student forum or equal access policy, it is important to consider
such factors as whether the school had previously adopted any other
policies or engaged in any other acts concerning religion, whether
the policy was adopted before or after any student religious group
sought to meet on school property, and whether the policy was
adopted as part of any broader set of guidelines. 125
The second required showing-that the student forum is open
to a sufficiently broad spectrum of subjects-derives from both free
speech clause and establishment clause doctrines. Under the free
speech clause, no speaker could claim an equal access right to public
property unless the property had been designated as a public forum
or limited public forum. In the case of a limited public forum, a
speaker would not have a free speech right of access unless the
property was available to a sufficiently broad, justifiably defined cat-
egory of subjects or speakers, and the speaker fit within any such
category.' 26 Under the establishment clause, religion may be in-
cluded within a broad class of beneficiaries of a public service, but it
may not be singled out as such a beneficiary. 127 If some secular
groups were excluded from the forum, the inclusion of religious
groups might constitute a special benefit to religion in contraven-
tion of the establishment clause. Therefore, a school that barred the
meetings of a controversial student political group, for example,
could have difficulty contending that it had created a sufficiently
open forum to permit the meetings of a religious group. 28
mandating moment of silence in public schools ostensibly for purposes of meditation,
prayer, or any other quiet activity chosen by each individual student, because Court
concluded statute's actual purpose was to promote prayer). Some observers believe that
the equal access issue is being exploited by evangelical religious groups as "the key to
open the schoolhouse door" to organized religious activity. Redlich, Separation of Church
and State: The Burger Court's Tortuous Journey, 60 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 901, 923 (1985).
Evidence that a school's adoption of an equal access policy was due to any such pressure
would negate the required secular purpose.
125 In Lubbock, for example, these factors indicated that the challenged equal access
policy was a ruse for perpetuating the school's longstanding practice of actively promot-
ing religion. 669 F.2d at 1044-45.
126 See supra text accompanying notes 37-39.
127 See, e.g., Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983); Widmar, 454 U.S. at 274 (stressing
university's "provision of benefits [access] to so broad a spectrum of groups" in uphold-
ing equal access for religious group); Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
128 See supra note 39. In designating its property as a limited public forum, the gov-
ernment may impose speaker or subject matter limitations that are "necessary to re-
serve" the forum "to expressive activity compatible with the property," so long as these
limitations are viewpoint neutral. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund,
Inc., 105 S. Ct. at 3458. Similarly, Tinker held that a public school may restrict student
expressive conduct if such conduct would "substantially interfere with the work of the
school or impinge upon the rights of other students." 393 U.S. at 509. In accordance
with these governing principles, a school could impose general subject matter con-
straints upon a student forum to ensure that the forum is compatible with the school's
educational mission. The school could also restrict the expressive conduct of particular
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2. Content-Neutral Restrictions on Student Group Meetings
Because of the establishment dangers inherent in concerted
religious expression in the public schools, and because of the diffi-
culty of ascertaining whether such expression in fact violates the es-
tablishment clause-in particular, whether reasonable students
actually perceive a school to be endorsing religion-a school's duty
under the establishment clause should be construed to go beyond
merely avoiding clear violations. Instead, as courts have recog-
nized, the school's duty should be viewed as the broader one of tak-
ing reasonably available, constitutionally permissible steps to
minimize the risk of an establishment clause violation. 129 Accord-
ingly, in addition to demonstrating the existence of a neutral, open
forum, the equal access proponent should also be required to show
that the school has taken such steps. In particular, the equal access
proponent should show that the school has imposed certain
content-neutral time, place, and manner regulations upon student
group meetings: the meetings should take place outside the com-
pulsory attendance period; the role of any adult supervisor should
be as limited as permissible under applicable law and should under
no circumstances include participation in student group meetings;
and the school should issue disclaimers and take other steps to en-
sure that students understand its neutral role under an equal access
policy.
Before addressing the specific rationale for each proposed mea-
sure, it is important to explain the underlying rationales common to
this whole set of requirements. The recommended regulations con-
stitute less drastic alternatives to either an unqualified grant of ac-
cess to a student religious group, with its attendant establishment
dangers, or an outright denial of access, with its attendant free
speech dangers.' 3 0 A school's grant of equal access in the absence
students or student groups in accordance with Tinker's substantial disruption or im-
pingement standard. However, because of the fundamental content neutrality require-
ment, schools would not be permitted to exclude student groups merely because of the
controversial nature of the subjects they address. See, e.g., Gay Alliance of Students v.
Matthews, 544 F.2d 162, 167 (4th Cir. 1976) (Markey, J., concurring).
129 See, e.g., Grand Rapids, 105 S. Ct. at 3226-27; see also Bell, 766 F.2d at 1407 ("[Wie
believe that religious activity in the public schools . . . requires stricter separation than
does a university campus or a public square."). Some courts have suggested that
schools' interests in minimizing risks of establishment clause violations could even jus-
tify the infringement of free speech rights. For example, in Bender, the Third Circuit
squarely held that the school's denial of equal access to Petros would violate the stu-
dents' free speech rights, 741 F.2d at 550, but it nonetheless ordered the school to deny
equal access to avoid an establishment clause violation. Id. at 560-61. In contrast, the
recommended measures are fully consistent with free speech principles. See infra note
131 and text accompanying notes 132-35.
130 Less drastic alternatives to either an outright denial or an unconditional grant of
access will not only maximize students' free speech rights, but will also minimize the
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of such regulations would not necessarily violate the establishment
clause. Nevertheless, because these content-neutral regulations
would significantly reduce the risk of an establishment clause viola-
tion without abridging students' free speech rights, 31 school offi-
cials and courts should require their imposition before granting
equal access to student religious groups.
One could argue that treating the proposed regulations as es-
sential prerequisites for a grant of equal access to student religious
groups limits students' free speech rights insofar as it recognizes the
school authorities' discretion not to create the type of forum to
which these groups would be granted access. There are several re-
sponses to this argument. First, a school's discretion to choose
whether or not to create the prescribed type of student forum is
simply one manifestation of government officials' general discretion
to choose whether or not to create limited public forums on govern-
ment property and to impose upon any such forum justifiable, view-
point neutral speaker or subject matter limitations. To this extent,
outside of inherent, traditional public forums, any first amendment
right of access to government property is always dependent upon
the discretion of government officials.' 3 2
Second, by preserving some degree of school discretion, the
likelihood of both basic types of potential establishment clause violations in this setting.
Alternatives to outright denial may enable a school to avoid violating the establishment
clause by conveying its disapproval of religion. Likewise, alternatives to an unqualified
grant may enable a school to avoid violating the establishment clause by conveying its
approval of religion.
131 See, e.g., Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 104 S. Ct. 3065 (1984).
Expression. . . is subject to reasonable time, place, and manner restric-
tions. . . provided that they are justified without reference to the con-
tent of the regulated speech, that they are narrowly tailored to serve a
significant governmental interest, and that they leave open ample alterna-
tive channels for communication of the information.
Id. at 3069 (citations omitted). The proposed measures easily satisfy this standard.
They are content neutral because they apply to all student groups. They are narrowly
tailored to serve the compelling governmental interest in complying with both the estab-
lishment clause and the free speech clause. Finally, they leave open ample alternative
channels for student group communication. All three measures should, in fact, enhance
students' expressive rights by de-emphasizing the school's traditional inculcative role
132 See supra text accompanying notes 34-39. Under the Equal Access Act, as well as
under the proposed analytical framework, a student forum will not be characterized as a
limited public forum sufficient to trigger the school's obligation to grant equal access to
student group meetings, regardless of "the religious, political, philosophical, or other
content of the speech at such meetings," unless the forum is subject to certain con-
straints. Specifically, under the Act, a school will not be deemed to have created a "lim-
ited open forum" sufficient to give rise to equal access rights unless it has granted an
"opportunity for one or more noncurriculum-related student groups to meet on school
premises during noninstructional time." 20 U.S.C. § 4071(a)-(b) (1984). Thus, a school
that created a forum for meetings of curriculum-related student groups, or for meetings
of any student groups during instructional time, would have no obligation under the Act
to grant equal access to student religious groups.
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proposed test is faithful to fundamental principles that protect the
autonomy of local school officials. Under these principles, courts
defer to school officials' decisions and "do not. . . intervene in the
resolution of conflicts which arise in the daily operation of school
systems" unless such conflicts "directly and sharply implicate basic
constitutional values."' 33 The proposed standards limit the situa-
tions in which a court could overrule a school's resolution of an
equal access claim to those that present such a sharp conflict: where
a school has denied equal access, notwithstanding the existence of
an open, neutral forum subject to the prescribed regulations; or
where the school has granted equal access, notwithstanding the ab-
sence of such a forum or notwithstanding other specific evidence
that the students perceive the school as endorsing religion.
There is an additional rationale for treating the proposed neu-
tral restrictions as fixed requirements, in and of themselves, rather
than as factors relevant to the ultimate issue of whether a school
sponsors, or appears to sponsor, religion. This ultimate issue is in-
herently elusive, calling for a conclusion that will inevitably reflect
the factfinder's value judgments.' 3 4 By substituting for this subjec-
tive inquiry an objective inquiry concerning the school's adoption of
specific measures, the proposed test imposes meaningful constraints
upon lower courts' discretion. It thereby affords more guidance to
school officials, students, and others interested in equal access con-
troversies and promotes consistency among schools and courts in
their resolutions of these controversies.13 5
'33 Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968). See also Sexton, Minority-Admis-
sions Programs after Bakke, 49 HARV. EDUC. REV. 313, 320-22 (1979) (discussing judicial
recognition that educational institutions should be allowed "considerable discretion" in
conducting educational affairs, reflecting both respect for academic freedom and courts'
lack of expertise).
134 See generally Davis, Facts in Lawmaking, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 931, 936 (1980) (when
court's inquiry depends upon "judgmental," "predictive," or "evaluative" facts, it may
appropriately rely more on devices such as judicial notice or presumptions and less on
particular evidentiary facts). Under the proposed framework, courts would in effect de-
fer, to some extent, to the judgment of local school authorities concerning whether their
students would perceive a grant of equal access as conveying the school's endorsement
of religion. Presumably, such a judgment would be at least one significant factor in a
school's decision whether or not to create an open student forum subject to the pre-
scribed content-neutral regulations. Under Professor Davis's analysis, it is particularly
appropriate for a court to defer to such a determination of "judgmental or predictive"
facts by a local school official. See id. (agency expertise "may in a sense serve as a substi-
tute for future facts").
135 Cf. Columbus Board ofEduc. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 491-92 (1979) (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting) (criticizing majority's vague standards for determining whether school
system's pupil assignment plan violates equal protection clause, as relegating determina-
tion to district court discretion).
[This approach] holds out the disturbing prospect of very different reme-
dies being imposed on similar school systems because of the predilec-
tions of individual judges and their good-faith but incongruent efforts to
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The first proposed neutral regulation-requiring student
groups to meet at times that are dearly separated from any period
when students are required to be at school-is designed to counter
reasonable inferences of school support for religion that might arise
from compulsory education laws. Anti-establishment values would
be best served by a requirement that the students meet after the
time when they are legally compelled to be at school.13 6
The second proposed neutral regulation-requiring the school
to comply with its supervisory obligations in the least obtrusive
manner that is legally permissible-is designed to curb reasonable
inferences of school sponsorship of religion that might arise from
school supervision rules. For example, a school may have a lower
degree of supervisory responsibility during hours not covered by
compulsory attendance laws.13 7 If so, that would afford an addi-
tional reason for requiring student groups to meet outside compul-
sory attendance hours. As another example, the school might be
able to fulfill its supervisory responsibility without requiring the
physical presence of an adult during student group meetings.' 38
make sense of this Court's confused pronouncements today. Concepts
such as "discriminatory purpose" and "systemwide violation" present
highly mixed questions of law and fact. If district court discretion is not
channelized by a clearly articulated methodology, the entire federal court
system will experience the disaffection which accompanies violation of
Cicero's maxim not to "lay down one rule in Athens and another rule in
Rome."
Id. As Justice Rehnquist noted, additional advantages that would result from a standard
"channelizing" district court discretion in cases involving educational policy and stu-
dents' constitutional rights would be the promotion of both local autonomy and stu-
dents' rights. Id.
136 Even with an interval between the conclusion of a student religious group's pre-
school meeting and the beginning of the school day, the religious students could remain
on school property and be seen by other students arriving for the beginning of classes.
This scenario could create reasonable perceptions that the religious group had the
school's support. See, e.g., Bell, 766 F.2d at 1405 n.14.
137 Many state statutes impose on schools a duty to supervise students' conduct on
school property only during the school day. See, e.g., Lauricella v. Board of Educ., 52
A.D.2d 710, 381 N.Y.S.2d 566 (1976); Carabba v. Anacortes School Dist. No. 103, 72
Wash. 2d 939, 435 P.2d 936 (1967). Schools generally have no duty to supervise stu-
dents who participate in voluntary extracurricular activities on school grounds after reg-
ular school hours, unless the activity is inherently dangerous. See, e.g., Bush v. Smith,
154 Ind. App. 382, 289 N.E.2d 800 (1972); Kantor v. Board of Educ., 251 A.D. 454, 296
N.Y.S. 516 (1937); Annot., 38 A.L.R. 3d 830, 852-53 (1971).
138 A random survey of the education statutes of several states reveals no express
requirement that the staff supervise student activities. At least one court has construed a
state statute to require such supervision, even without an express mandate. SeeJohnson
v. Huntington Beach Union High School Dist., 68 Cal. App. 3d 1, 137 Cal. Rptr. 43, cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 877 (1977) (construing CAL. EDUC. CODE § 44807 (West 1978), as re-
quiring a "faculty sponsor" to attend all student activities). Most states surveyed grant
broad discretion to local authorities to establish all operating regulations for the
schools. See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 24, § 7-775 (Purdon 1962 and Supp. 1985) ("The
board of school directors of any district may permit the use of its school grounds and
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Even if applicable legal standards did require an adult to be present
during a student meeting, that adult should under no circumstances
participate in the meeting. The school should minimize the risk that
reasonable students would perceive it, through its authorized adult
monitors, as endorsing the content of a student group's expressive
conduct. Therefore, any such monitor should be confined to a
strictly custodial role.1 39
The final proposed content-neutral regulation is designed to
counter perceptions of school support for religion that could arise
from the public schools' inculcative function, as well as from the stu-
dents' relative immaturity or impressionability. Rather than impos-
ing a per se prohibition upon student religious meetings because of
students' presumed inability to comprehend the school's neutral
role under an equal access policy, courts should instead require
schools to make reasonable efforts to explain the equal access and
public forum concepts to their students. 140
buildings for social, recreation, and other proper purposes, under such rules and regula-
tions as the board may adopt.") At least in the absence of a more specific statute or
regulation, a school's supervisory duty is generally measured by a negligence standard-
i.e., it must exercise the degree of care that an ordinarily prudent person would exercise
under similar circumstances. See, e.g., Woodsmall v. Mount Diablo Unified School Dist.,
188 Cal. App. 2d 262, 10 Cal. Rptr. 447 (1961); Miller v. Griesel, 261 Ind. 604, 308
N.E.2d 701 (1974); Titus v. Lindberg, 49 NJ. 66, 228 A.2d 65 (1967); Morris v. Douglas
County School Dist. No. 9, 241 Or. 23, 403 P.2d 775 (1965); Cirillo v. Milwaukee, 34
Wis. 2d 705, 150 N.W.2d 460 (1967). "Absent special dangerous circumstances," a
school is not required to provide "constant supervision of all movements of all pupils at
all times." Connett v. Fremont County School Dist. No. 6, 581 P.2d 1097, 1103 (Wyo.
1978). Accord Schuyler v. Board of Educ., 18 A.D.2d 406, 408, 239 N.Y.S.2d 769, 771
(1963), aff'd me., 15 N.Y.2d 746, 205 N.E.2d 311, 257 N.Y.S.2d 174 (1965).
139 The role of an adult monitor who is authorized only to maintain order and disci-
pline could be analogized to that of a policeman at a religious rally in a public park,
which has been held consistent with the establishment clause. See O'Hair v. Andrus, 613
F.2d 931, 935 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
140 In upholding the access claims of religious expression to nonschool public fo-
rums, courts have relied upon disclaimers to minimize establishment clause problems.
See, e.g., McCreary, 739 F.2d at 728 (establishment clause does not bar temporary location
of privately-owned nativity scene in public park if accompanied by appropriate disclaim-
ers);Jaffe v. Alexis, 659 F.2d 1018, 1022 (9th Cir. 1981) (state agency's fears that public
might perceive it as endorsing views of religious speakers granted access to its property
.,can easily be allayed by posting signs"); Allen v. Morton, 495 F.2d 65, 67 (D.C. Cir.
1973) (per curiam) (temporary display of creche in public park would not violate estab-
lishment clause if accompanied by plaques indicating government did not sponsor it).
See also Widmar, 454 U.S. at 274 n.14 (noting that university handbook contained state-
ment disclaiming university endorsement of student organizations). Of course, disclaim-
ers will not always eliminate establishment clause violations. See, e.g., Stone v. Graham,
449 U.S. 39 (1980) (per curiam) (notwithstanding disclaimer on copy of Ten Command-
ments required to be posted in public school classroom, which stated that Command-
ments constitute basis of secular legal system, establishment clause was violated because
statute had no clear secular purpose).
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C. Showing Required To Overcome Equal Access Right
In accordance with the basic tenets of public forum doctrine, if
a student religious group can make the specific showings to estab-
lish an access right to a public high school forum, no special restric-
tion may be imposed upon the group unless it is necessary to
promote a compelling governmental interest-namely, the interest
in avoiding an establishment clause violation.141 No limitations
should be imposed upon any student group meetings unless they
are the least restrictive necessary to avert an establishment clause
problem. Accordingly, the student religious group should not be
denied access altogether unless the equal access opponent can sat-
isfy the heavy burden of proving that less drastic alternative meas-
ures will not be sufficient to prevent an establishment clause
violation. In accordance with general public forum doctrine, the
equal access opponent should be required to adduce specific evi-
dence to demonstrate both an establishment clause violation and
the absence of less restrictive alternatives.
The equal access opponent can attempt to demonstrate, for ex-
ample, that reasonable students would perceive the school's grant of
equal access to a student religious group as conveying its support
for religion because the forum is not actually utilized by numerous,
diverse student groups, or because one or more religious groups
predominate in actually using the forum. Evidence concerning both
the forum's actual utilization and the relative predominance of reli-
gious groups was central to the Supreme Court's analysis in
Widmar.142
141 See supra text accompanying notes 34-36. In Widmar the Supreme Court recog-
nized that the university's "interest ... in complying with its constitutional obligations
[under the establishment clause and the state constitutional counterpart] may be charac-
terized as compelling." 454 U.S. at 271. In McCreary v. Stone, 575 F. Supp. 1112, 1133
(S.D.N.Y. 1983), 739 F.2d 716 (2d Cir. 1984), aff'd mem. by an equally divided Court sub.
nom. Board of Trustees v. McCreary, 105 S. Ct. 1859 (1985), the court held that the
avoidance of an establishment clause violation was a sufficiently compelling state inter-
est to justify content-based exclusion of speech from a public forum.
142 The absence of the suggested actual utilization and nonpredominance factors
would neither disprove the existence of a limited public forum nor prove the existence
of an establishment clause violation. So long as the school property was in fact open
and available as a matter of policy, a limited public forum should be found to exist, even
if numerous, diverse student groups did not actually utilize it. See McCreary, 739 F.2d at
722 (in concluding that park constituted public forum, court stressed its availability for
free speech purposes; that park had not actually been utilized by numerous, diverse
speakers was irrelevant). Likewise, so long as the school is neither supporting any stu-
dent religious group nor perceived by the students to do so, the student religious group
meetings would not violate the establishment clause, even if such meetings did
predominate. It could be argued that courts should deem these two material but nones-
sential factors concerning the existence of an open student forum to be independently
necessary prerequisites for a grant of equal access, rather than simply probative of the
ultimate prerequisites for such grant (the presence of an open student forum and the
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In Widmar, the Court deemed the evidence concerning the size-
able and broad array of student groups actually meeting on campus
to be relevant to the free speech analysis because it indicated that
the campus was available to a sufficiently broad range of student
speech to constitute a limited public forum.1 43 This evidence was
also relevant to the Court's establishment clause analysis because it
indicated that no reasonable student should infer the school to be
sponsoring the religious content of student speech. 144 Similarly, in
support of its conclusion that reasonable students should not con-
strue a grant of equal access as conveying the university's endorse-
ment of religion, Widmar relied upon the fact that religious student
groups did not predominate in using the forum. However, the
Court indicated that if, at some future point, one or more religious
groups did come to dominate the forum, then it might be appropri-
ate to exclude them. 145
An equal access opponent could potentially meet its burden of
proof necessary to overcome a right of access by adducing the fol-
lowing types of evidence: testimony of individual students that they
perceive the school as sponsoring religion; opinion testimony by ex-
perts in adolescent psychology or education that, under the circum-
stances, a reasonable student would infer school support for
religion; 146 evidence concerning objective factors that would sup-
port a conclusion that a hypothetical "reasonable student" would
infer school endorsement of religion; 147 and a survey of students
demonstrating that some statistically significant portion of them
absence of actual or perceived school sponsorship of religion). However, to elevate
these evidentiary facts into constitutionally ultimate facts would not entail the major
advantages that would result from attributing independent constitutional significance to
the proposed content-neutral regulations: the confinement of lower courts' discretion,
and the concomitant promotion of the autonomy of local school officials, within consti-
tutional parameters. See supra text accompanying notes 134-35. Because these interme-
diate issues would themselves call for relatively open-ended, subjective determinations,
they would likely fail to circumscribe the discretion that lower courts could exercise in
evaluating the ultimate issues.
143 454 U.S. at 277.
144 Id. at 274.
145 See id. at 275 ("At least in the absence of empirical evidence that religious groups
will dominate [the university's] open forum. . . the advancement of religion would not
be the forum's 'primary effect.' ") (emphasis added).
146 This type of evidence was considered in Bell, see supra note 60. For other exam-
ples of establishment clause cases that have considered such evidence, see, e.g., Country
Hills Christian Church v. Unified School Dist. No. 512, 560 F. Supp., 1207, 1216 (D.
Kan. 1983); Duffy v. Las Cruces Pub. Schools, 557 F. Supp. 1013, 1016-17 (D. N.M.
1983); Citizens Concerned for Separation of Church and State v. City & County of Den-
ver, 526 F. Supp. 1310, 1314-15 (D. Colo. 1981).
147 This could include evidence concerning such institutional factors as any steps the
school may take to promote its noninculcative role, and the particular options available
to the school in fulfilling its supervisory obligations. Evidence concerning the general
intellectual and emotional levels of a particular school's student body could also be rele-
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perceived the school to be endorsing religion. 148
A central issue under the proposed analysis is whether any es-
tablishment clause problems that might result from student reli-
gious group meetings could be averted through alternative
measures, that are less drastic than outright denial of access. Two
such alternative measures for curbing any reasonable perception of
school endorsement are suggested by Bender. First, the student
members of the religious group, Petros, volunteered not to use any
school media to announce their meetings or to publicize their activi-
ties. 149 Second, the principal offered Petros members the alterna-
tive of being "released" from school during the student activity
period so they could meet in another nearby location.' 50 Other less
drastic alternatives to outright denial of access that would minimize
the establishment clause risks resulting from student religious
group meetings include limitations upon the length or frequency of
student group meetings, requirements that such meetings occur in
areas of the school that are not normally used for regular classroom
instruction,15 1 and requirements that such meetings take place dur-
ing evenings or weekends. 152
vant. See, e.g., Trachtman v. Anker, 426 F. Supp. 198, 202 & n.3 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), rev'd,
563 F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 1977).
148 See generally Citizens Concerned for Separation of Church and State, 526 F. Supp. at
1312-15 (in evaluating whether governmentally displayed nativity scene conveyed
message of government approval, court considered expert testimony about scene's his-
toric and folkloric significance, expressions of reactions by individuals who viewed it,
and psychological study of perceptions of certain Jewish children). The suggestion that
such evidence might overcome a constitutionally-based equal access right implicates the
broader question of the extent to which constitutional issues should turn on adjudica-
tive, as opposed to legislative, facts. See generally Davis, Facts in Lawmaking, 80 COLUM. L.
REV. 931 (1980).
149 741 F.2d at 542.
150 Id. at 553 (citing Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 315 (1952)).
151 Cf Grand Rapids, 105 S. Ct. at 3227 (establishment clause problems increased
when secular subjects taught in same classrooms as religious).
152 Many state statutes expressly provide that school buildings may be opened to
religious meetings during nonschool hours. E.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 122, § 10-22.10
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1981-82); Ky. REV. STAT. § 162.050 (1980); OHio REV. CODE ANN.
§§ 3313.76-.77 (1980). Courts have held that the use of school buildings for religious
purposes during nonschool hours does not violate the establishment clause or its state
counterparts. See, e.g., Southside Estates Baptist Church v. Board of Trustees, 115 So.
2d 697 (Fla. 1959); Nichols v. School Directors, 93 Ill. 61 (1879); Davis v. Boget, 50
Iowa 11 (1878); State er reL Gilbert v. Dilley, 95 Neb. 527, 145 N.W. 999 (1914); Resnick
v. East Brunswick Township Bd. of Educ., 77 NJ. 88, 389 A.2d 944 (1978). Courts have
also held that the free speech clause requires that religious groups be allowed to meet in
school buildings during nonschool hours if other groups are allowed to do so. See, e.g.,
Country Hills Christian Church, 560 F. Supp. 1207.
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EVALUATION OF BENDER UNDER THE PROPOSED
ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
The analytical approach that the Third Circuit employed in
Bender differs from the analytical framework recommended in this
Article in several significant respects. First, in concluding that Pe-
tros's meetings would violate the establishment clause, the Bender
majority relied too heavily upon generalizations and presumptions
about high school students' alleged immaturity and high schools'
allegedly inculcative atmosphere. In contrast, under the proposed
framework, if Petros could make the requisite showings for an equal
access right, then an equal access opponent could overcome this
showing only if it substantiated an establishment clause violation by
specific evidence. Furthermore, if Petros made the specified show-
ings, it could not be denied access altogether unless specific evi-
dence demonstrated that no alternative measures, less burdensome
upon the students' free speech rights, would avoid the establish-
ment clause violation. This insistence upon specific evidence pro-
motes the students' free speech rights.
Another significant distinction between the Third Circuit's ap-
proach and the one proposed in this Article is that the latter pro-
vides more guidance for parties involved in equal access disputes,
without arbitrarily elevating one set of competing constitutional
values over the other. Having concluded that a constitutional viola-
tion would result from either a grant or a denial of access, the Third
Circuit in effect made a value judgment as to which violation would
be the lesser of two evils. In contrast, under the proposed analysis,
a finding that a grant of access to a student religious group would
violate the establishment clause would be dispositive. To be sure,
alternative restrictions, less drastic than outright denial of access,
would be considered. However, the student religious group would
under no circumstances be granted access on the same terms as
other student groups because the avoidance of an establishment
clause violation constitutes a compelling state interest sufficient to
justify limitations upon free speech rights. 153 The open-ended bal-
ancing of alternative constitutional violations in which the Third
Circuit engaged would be neither necessary nor appropriate under
the proposed framework.
Notwithstanding the differences between the proposed analyti-
cal framework and the Third Circuit's approach, both lead to the
same ultimate conclusion: that Petros should not have been permit-
153 See supra note 141.
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ted to meet in school during the student activity period. 154 The Pe-
tros students might be able to make the first showing necessary to
establish an equal access right-that the school had created a neu-
tral, open student forum. They could not, however, make the sec-
ond requisite showing-that the school had adopted the
recommended content-neutral regulations for minimizing establish-
ment dangers.
Although the Bender record is relatively limited because the case
was decided on summary judgment motions, it does contain some
evidence supporting both prescribed indicia of an open student fo-
rum. First, the conclusion that the student activity period was not
created for the impermissible purpose of advancing religion is sup-
ported by the fact that the first religious group's request to meet
during that period, Petros's request, occurred "long" after the pe-
riod was created.1 55 The school's secular purpose in creating the
forum is further supported by its refusal to authorize meetings of
the only religious group to seek such authorization-namely, Petros.
Second, the stated subject matter limitations upon student groups-
those that would contribute to the students' "intellectual, physical
or social development" and were "legal and constitutionally
proper"-satisfy the recommended standard of encompassing reli-
gion without singling it out. Facially, these limitations appear to
comply with the criteria for constitutionally permissible constraints
upon the availability of a limited public forum: they would probably
be deemed "necessary to reserve the [school] to expressive activity
compatible with" it, and they are also viewpoint neutral. Moreover,
the absence of evidence that a student group had ever been denied
154 It likewise appears that no student religious group that has been involved in a
reported equal access case has made the showings necessary to be entitled to access on
the terms it sought. Because the students in Brandon asked to meet during the compul-
sory attendance period, they could not satisfy one of the proposed prerequisites for a
prima fade equal access right. 635 F.2d at 979. In both Lubbock and Bell, the nonsecular
purpose underlying the student forums should also preclude any prima fade free speech
right of access for a student religious group. See Bell, 766 F.2d at 1402-03; Lubbock, 669
F.2d at 1044-45. It may well be that few high schools would be able or willing to comply
with the prescribed standards for permitting student religious groups to meet at school.
With respect to the open student forum requirement, school officials may decide that
the concomitant obligation to grant access to controversial secular groups is too high a
price to pay for the right to grant equal access to religious groups. See supra note 128
and accompanying text. The nondispositive actual utilization and nonpredominance
factors, see supra text accompanying notes 142-45, may be difficult to satisfy in many high
schools due to demographic factors. As compared to a typical college student body, the
typical high school student body is smaller and drawn from a more limited geographic
area, thus tending to be more homogeneous. The present Article does not purport to
resolve these factual questions. Rather, it delineates the legally-mandated conditions
with which any school must comply if it should in fact choose to permit student religious
meetings.
155 563 F. Supp. at 709.
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permission to meet is consistent with the lack of additional, defacto
subject matter limitations.1 56
The two suggested material but nondispositive factors for as-
sessing whether there is a neutral, open student forum also support
the conclusion that the requisite forum probably existed in
Bender.157 First, the student forum was actually utilized by numer-
ous, diverse student groups, relative to the student body's size. In-
deed, the ratio between the number of student groups and the total
student population in Bender was almost identical to the ratio be-
tween the corresponding numbers in Widmar.'58 Second, when Pe-
tros sought to meet, religious groups did not dominate the forum
since none of the other student groups then meeting engaged in
religious expression. Nor did it appear that Petros itself would
dominate the forum, in light of the small number of students who
expressed an interest in it.i59
Notwithstanding that the student activity period in Bender might
have satisfied the prescribed characteristics of a bona fide open stu-
dent forum, Petros was correctly denied permission to meet during
that period. Under the proposed analytical framework, Petros did
not establish an equal access right because the school had not im-
plemented the recommended content-neutral measures for mini-
mizing establishment dangers. Of greatest concern, the student
meetings took place during the compulsory attendance period, and
teachers or other school-approved adults were authorized to partici-
pate in the meetings.1 60
156 See supra text accompanying notes 39 & 128. Whether the student activity period
was truly open to diverse student groups cannot be definitively answered on the basis of
the relatively sparse record. For example, there was only limited evidence as to whether
a principal had ever previously denied a student group permission to meet during the
activity period. In view of the homogeneous nature of the extant clubs and the breadth
of the principal's authority to disapprove proposed clubs on the ground that they did
not contribute to the students' "development," or were not "proper," it is unclear
whether controversial secular groups would have been allowed to meet. If not, Petros
might have difficulty satisfying the open student forum standard. If the student activity
period were classified as a nonpublic forum, the exclusion of Petros because of establish-
ment clause concerns would probably satisfy the "reasonableness" standard that would
then govern. See supra note 39.
157 See supra text accompanying notes 142-45.
158 In Bender, there were 25 student groups and a student body of 2,500. 741 F.2d at
567 (Adams, J., dissenting). In Widmar, there were 100 student groups and a student
body of 11,000. 454 U.S. at 450.
159 Before receiving the opinion of counsel that Petros's meetings would violate the
establishment clause, the principal allowed Petros to hold an organizational meeting.
Approximately 45 students, comprising about 2% of the student body, attended. 741
F.2d at 543, 547.
160 See supra text accompanying notes 62-63. The student members of Petros offered
to withdraw their request for an adult advisor. 563 F. Supp. at 715-16. This offer sug-
gests that the physical presence of an adult may not have been legally required. The
record does not reveal whether the school implemented the third recommended coun-
EQUAL ACCESS
CONCLUSION
It seems unlikely that the Supreme Court will absolutely pro-
hibit equal access under all circumstances, even if it concludes that
the student religious group in Bender should not have been allowed
to meet under the circumstances of that case. Instead, in line with
its public forum and students' rights decisions, the Court will proba-
bly endorse some type of ad hoc analysis for resolving particular
equal access controversies. A nonabsolutist approach would also be
consistent with the Court's latest decision concerning public school
religious expression.
This Article has demonstrated that only an approach that ac-
cords some discretion to school officials can be faithful to the two
competing sets of constitutional principles implicated in any equal
access controversy. It has also delineated a specific analytical frame-
work that should facilitate the resolution of equal access issues con-
sistently with both sets of constitutional values. While this analytical
framework is sufficiently flexible to take into account the specific
facts and circumstances involved in any particular controversy, it is
also sufficiently precise to provide advance guidance and
predictability.
As compellingly stated in the Bender dissent, a non per se test,
such as the one proposed here, best promotes the fundamental first
amendment values at stake in- any equal access case.
."[T]he purposes of the First Amendment are better served by re-
jecting a per se rule, even in cases involving religion and the
school. One of the great triumphs of America's constitutional ex-
periment has been the avoidance of religious factionalism in the
political sphere. Our country's continued progress in this en-
deavor ultimately depends on the individual citizen's tolerance
and respect for religious diversity. When the schools can teach
such tolerance to our young citizens without impermissibly spon-
soring religion, I believe the Constitution and the Nation are the
better for it.161
termeasure-the issuance of disclaimers and follow-up efforts to ensure the students'
understanding of its neutral role.
161 741 F.2d at 569-70 (Adams, J., dissenting).
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